I. THE PROBLEM

Over a period of several years, the late Rabbi Abraham Blumenkrantz, in the annual editions of his popular compendium *The Laws of Pesach: A Digest*, called into question the permissibility of using cups and similar utensils made of styrofoam because of the presence of a questionable ingredient introduced in the manufacture of those products.¹

The cups in question are composed primarily of expandable polystyrene, a petrochemical posing no *kashrut* problem whatsoever. Polystyrene in the form of thousands of extremely small beads are pounded into a cup-shaped mold where the beads are expanded by heat in the form of culinary steam and agitated. In order to facilitate removal of the cup from its mold, a release agent is added to the polymer beads during early stages of production. According to industry sources, the release agent used for this purpose is zinc stearate, which, in turn, is produced by mixing zinc oxide with stearic acid. Although stearic acid can be derived from vegetable oil, it is generally produced from less expensive tallow. Moreover, some manufacturers have reported difficulty in attempting to use a vegetable-derived stearic acid because vegetable-based fatty acids have a different melting point.² According to differing industry sources, the ratio of zinc stearate added to the polymer beads is between 991 and 2,400 parts per million by weight. Thus, the admixture of zinc stearate is between slightly less than 1 and 2.4 per 1,000, an infinitesimal quantity well within the threshold for application of the principle of nullification or *bittul*. In addition, as a result of its processing, the zinc stearate used in manufacture of the styrofoam is reported to be a completely tasteless dry powder. Accordingly, it may well be the case that, despite its organic origin, the transformation is such that the halakhic status of zinc stearate is that of “mere wood” not having the character or status of a foodstuff and hence permissible. That principle is formulated with regard to “dry bones” and recorded in *Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah* 87:10.
II. BITTUL WITHIN THE UTENSIL

Assuming that zinc stearate is a halakhically forbidden substance, it would appear that the extremely small proportion of that substance absorbed by the polystyrene beads is nullified in that petrochemical substance. The volume of permissible polystyrene compared to the miniscule amount of zinc stearate is far, far greater than the sixty to one ratio necessary for the principle of *bittul* to be operative. The styrofoam issue is entirely comparable to a hypothetical situation in which a forbidden substance is added to molten metal used for fashioning cooking utensils. Since the forbidden substance is nullified within the material from which the utensil is fashioned it would seem that the principle of *bittul* renders those utensils permissible for use without further concern.

The sole hesitation in applying the principle of *bittul* in such instances is the consideration that *bittul* may apply only to the combination of a permissible foodstuff with another forbidden foodstuff but not in situations involving the admixture of a foodstuff in a non-food substance. The theoretical issue is whether the principle of nullification reflects the fact that the “taste” of a forbidden substance is masked, and hence nullified, by the “taste” of a quantity sixty times as large. If so, tasteless, non-food materials would not serve to nullify the forbidden “taste” since such materials have no flavor capable of masking the forbidden “taste.” Alternatively, the principle of nullification may reflect the concept that the taste of a foodstuff is dissipated, rather than masked, through dispersion in a quantity sixty times as great as the forbidden food product. If so, “taste” may be dispersed, and hence nullified, through mixture with *any* substance, including materials that are not foodstuffs. This writer is inclined to accept the latter analysis primarily because there is no source declaring that nullification may occur solely through admixture in a foodstuff.

Once nullification has occurred within the substance of which the utensil is formed there is no further problem with regard to use of the utensil. However, if nullification has not occurred within the substance of the utensil, use of the utensil for hot food will cause the forbidden substance emitted from the walls of the utensil to leech into the food beverage placed in this utensil. To be sure, *post factum*, the forbidden substance emitted from the wall of the container is subject to nullification in the permitted food placed in the utensil. There is, however, a prohibition against intentionally nullifying a forbidden substance. That is precisely what takes place when permitted foods are introduced into a container of such nature.
III. BITTUL OF SURFACE RESIDUE

The same problem presents itself in yet another guise. Unquestionably, a portion of the zinc stearate is absorbed by the polymer beads of which the styrofoam is composed. However, since zinc stearate is used as a release agent to prevent expanded beads from adhering to the mold it must be presumed that a portion of that substance remains unabsorbed and serves to coat the exterior of the bead. Any portion of zinc stearate not absorbed by the polymer beads is not nullified in the production process. Hence, regardless of whether a forbidden foodstuff is subject to nullification in a non-food substance, the zinc stearate that remains on the surface of the beads is not subject to nullification until it comes into contact with the food or beverage placed in the utensil. Accordingly, every use of a styrofoam cup represents a potentially purposeful act of nullification of a forbidden substance.

Some authorities, including Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 99:7 and 122:5, espouse the theory that, essentially, intentional nullification is forbidden lest an error be committed in assessing the quantity of permissible food in the resultant mixture and lead to an improperly nullified, and hence non-kosher, mixture being accepted as kosher. Accordingly, those authorities rule that a utensil that has absorbed a small amount of a non-kosher product, but which is regularly used for copious quantities of food, may be used for cooking kosher food even though such cooking involves an intentional act of nullification. Those authorities reason that since, empirically, every use of the utensil will result in actual nullification, there is no concern that the quantity of permissible foodstuff will be incorrectly estimated. According to that view, there would be no reason to refrain from use of styrofoam cups since even the smallest quantity of food or drink will serve to nullify the infinitesimal amount of zinc stearate coating the surface of the beads.

That view is however, challenged by Taz, Yoreh De’ah 99:15, and Shakh, Yoreh De’ah 122:3, who maintain that the prohibition against intentional nullification is all-encompassing and applies even in situations that cannot result in inadvertent consumption of a forbidden product. Many authorities, including Taz, Yoreh De’ah, 99:15, do indeed limit that stringency to utensils that have absorbed a forbidden substance within the previous twenty-four hour period but regard use of such utensils entirely permissible after a twenty-four hour period has elapsed. However, as has been noted, the production of styrofoam cups leaves a residue of zinc stearate on the surface. The twenty-four hour
rule applies only to “swallowed” or absorbed materials, not to those that adhere to the surface.5

Another basis for permitting use of styrofoam cups is that the user has no intention to nullify the forbidden substance. Indeed, he or she has neither need nor desire for nullification nor, for that matter, even actual awareness that nullification is taking place. Terumat ha-Deshen, no. 171, quoted by Rema, Toreh De’ah 84:13, is widely cited as ruling that the prohibition against nullification is limited to situations in which nullification is desired. The issue discussed by Terumat ha-Deshen is the permissibility of heating a honeycomb in which portions of forbidden creatures may be present. Terumat ha-Deshen permits the procedure on the grounds that there is no intention to dissolve, and thereby nullify, the forbidden creatures.

Taz, Toreh De’ah 137:4, understands this exception to the rule prohibiting nullification to be applicable only in situations in which the otherwise permissible foodstuff could not at all be used other than by means of nullification of an impermissible component. Thus he rules that wine contained in a cask whose spigot contains a small amount of non-kosher residue may not be removed by allowing it to flow through the spigot since it is possible to create another opening in order to remove the wine. The rationale underlying that distinction appears to be that a) only “intentional” nullification is proscribed and b) “intention” to nullify is perceived or imputed in all circumstances in which an alternative expedient to gain access to the kosher food product is available but is eschewed. Only in circumstances in which such an expedient is non-existent is there no perceived intention to nullify. Consequently, even according to Taz, assuming that it is impossible to create another opening in the wine cask, the cask may be used. Moreover, there is no indication that an endeavor must be made to seek another cask posing no problem of nullification in which to store the wine or even that use of such a cask, if available, is to be preferred. Hence, even according to Taz, there would appear to be no problem with regard to use of styrofoam cups even if paper hot cups are an available alternative.

However, Teshuvot R. Akiva Eger, no. 77, limits the leniency reflected in the ruling of Terumat ha-Deshen to situations in which the act leading to nullification is necessary to the preparation of an edible foodstuff, e.g., rendering a honeycomb in order to extract the honey, and in which the nullification is unintended but is a mere epiphenomenon resulting from preparation of the foodstuff. In the case of honey, rendering the honey is intended to facilitate removal of foreign sub-
stances such as the bodies of forbidden creatures rather than as a means of nullifying the forbidden substance within the mixture; the “taste” emitted in the process does become nullified but it is clear from the act of removing the creatures themselves that nullification is not intended.

Moreover, suggests R. Akiva Eger, Terumat ha-Deshen’s leniency may be limited to situations in which the presence of a forbidden substance is a matter of doubt but may not be applicable in situations in which the presence of a forbidden substance is a certainty.

If so, placing a hot beverage in a container coated with a minute quantity of a forbidden substance would not be included in the exception to the rule prohibiting nullification since it is not an act performed for the purpose of preparing a foodstuff and the act certainly does not manifest a desire to avoid nullification. Use of a styrofoam utensil of the nature described, according to R. Akiva Eger, would be categorized as an act of intentional nullification.

It has been suggested that the problem with styrofoam utensils is readily resolved on the basis of the rule formulated by the Mishnah, Terumot 11:6-8. The Mishnah declares that a silo, a wine keg, a container of olives or the like used to store terumah may be used by non-kohanim for ordinary grains and beverages after having been cleansed in an appropriate manner despite the fact that a small remnant or a residue of terumah continues to adhere to the surface of the utensil or to the place in which those items were stored. That residue is nullified by the non-terumah foodstuffs placed in those containers and such nullification is permitted at least, according to Taz, Yoreh De’ah 137:4, when other casks are not readily available. The principle reflected in the Mishnah, if applicable to styrofoam, would render use of such cups permissible at least when substitutes are not readily available.

However, perusal of the interpretation of those statements of the Mishnah by the classical commentators shows that the application of the rule is quite narrow. Rabbenu Shimshon, Terumot 11:8, declares that the rule is limited solely to terumah and is based upon the prohibition against “wasting” terumah. Terumah may be eaten or otherwise enjoyed by a priest but neither the kohen nor any other Jew may destroy such sanctified produce. Accordingly, since scouring casks for removal of any remaining residue would necessarily entail “destruction” of the terumah removed in the process, the Sages did not extend their prohibition against intentional nullification to such a situation. Tosefet R. Akiva Eger, ad locum, cites the ruling of Rashba (who incidentally maintains that the prohibition against intentional nullification is bibli-
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cal, rather than rabbinic in nature) to the effect that the ruling of the Mishnah is limited to types of terumah whose obligation, and hence sanctity, is only rabbinic in nature and specifically excludes its applicability to biblically prohibited foodstuffs such as carrion. R. Akiva Eger further cites the comments of Tosafot and Rashbam who limit the rule of the Mishnah to casks that have not yet been delivered to a kohen but remain in the possession of the Israelite owner of the foodstuff. According to those authorities, the rule formulated in the Mishnah reflects the notion that the residue is not at all terumah because, in designating the wine or the like and pronouncing it to be terumah, the Israelite owner of the foodstuff recognizes full well the problem he will face with regard to future use of his casks when he pours the wine into the priest’s utensils and hence the owner has no intention of sanctifying the residue as terumah. It may also be noted that none of the commentators on Yoreh De‘ah or of the latter-day decisors cite this Mishnah in conjunction with discussions of nullification of forbidden foods. Indeed, the entire discussion with regard to utensils used only for copious quantities of food assumes that the prohibition against intentional nullification includes not only nullification of the residue of a forbidden substance but also applies to nullification of the “taste” absorbed in a utensil that cannot at all be removed by cleansing.

However, although the prohibition against nullification of a forbidden substance extends even to minute residues, there may yet be grounds for excluding the zinc stearate that remains on the surface of the polymer beads from the category of a “forbidden substance.” The principle formulated by Tiferet Yisra‘el, Avodah Zarah, Bo‘az 2:3, and Arukh ha-Shulhan, Yoreh De‘ah 84:36, to the effect that the Torah does not take cognizance of non-clinical phenomena is well-known. The zinc stearate remaining on the surface of the polymer beads cannot be detected by any of the five senses. Assuming that the residue remaining on the surface can be detected only by laboratory analysis, it should follow that application of the principle formulated by Tiferet Yisra‘el and Arukh ha-Shulhan would yield the conclusion that such residue is halakhically innocuous.

The quantity of zinc stearate absorbed by the polymer beads is, of course, readily perceivable prior to its absorption and hence the permissibility of using styrofoam utensils for hot foods is contingent upon the earlier discussed issue of nullification.
FORMULA-FED VEAL

I. HUMANE TREATMENT

Animal rights groups have long protested the condition under which animals and poultry are raised for commercial markets. Methods employed in raising calves for veal have also been an ongoing focus of attention. Animal rights groups charge that the calves are raised in inhumane conditions. Not surprisingly, those contentions have been denied by the meat industry. Nevertheless, the most successful animal rights boycott in the United States began more than twenty years ago with publication of photographs of formula-fed veal calves tethered in tiny crates in which they were virtually immobilized. As a result, consumption of veal plummeted from an average of four pounds a year per person to approximately half a pound per year. A recent feature article in the Dining section of The New York Times reports the growth of a yet nascent movement within the industry to raise pastured calves that are suckled and later fed grass and grain. Meat derived from such calves is not only “certified humane” but is reportedly more tender and more flavorful than formula-fed veal.

The meat of calves raised on grass or grain is rosy or pink in color. Formula-fed veal, in contrast, is prized for its white color which is the result of a lack of iron. R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer, IV, no. 92, addresses the propriety of inhumane treatment of animals in order to achieve that purpose.

Although wantonly causing pain to animals is forbidden, the prohibition against causing pain to animals is generally regarded as inapplicable in situations in which there is human benefit, at least when the benefit is substantial in nature. Nevertheless, asserts Iggerot Mosheh, infliction of pain upon animals can be sanctioned only for a recognized and legitimate human benefit. Even when normatively permitted, avoidance of causing pain to animals is regarded as an act of piety, at least in most circumstances.

Thus, although giving vent to rage or anger has a calming effect, Jewish law does not recognize that need as legitimizing either destruction of property, even one’s own, or infliction of pain upon animals. Iggerot Mosheh asserts that such an act, when not performed to advance a legitimate human goal, is forbidden even if the act would redound to a person’s financial advantage. Trapping an animal in order to sell its pelt is permitted; however, an act of wanton cruelty that is not designed
to yield a human benefit is forbidden even if one receives remuneration for inflicting such pain upon the animal. The distinction is quite simple. Fur is used to satisfy a legitimate human need for clothing and hence money may be accepted in order to satisfy another person’s need for the pelt. Wanton infliction of pain does not satisfy a legitimate human need and does not acquire legitimacy simply because one is paid for performing such an act. Indeed, that conclusion is entirely cogent: otherwise forbidden acts of cruelty could be rendered permissible simply on the basis of a pact between two persons who agree to pay one another for engaging in such conduct.

Lagerot Mosheh concedes that formula-feeding might be sanctioned if the purpose were to make the animals gain weight or to make the meat more tasty; both purposes reflect normal and legitimate human needs. Lagerot Mosheh asserts that white veal is neither tastier nor more healthful than other veal; any claim of that nature he declares to be prohibited as fraud. Lagerot Mosheh does not recognize any enhanced esthetic appeal that may be associated with white veal as satisfying a legitimate human need and hence he rules that raising calves in an inhumane manner is forbidden.

Lagerot Mosheh’s halakhic points are certainly well-considered. However, he seems to have been provided with less than complete information. Some consumers do indeed prefer formula-fed veal because of its whiteness. However, feeding calves formula rather than grass or grain also significantly reduces the cost of producing veal. Moreover, there is no gainsaying the fact that the taste is entirely different. The taste of grass or grain-fed veal is similar to mild beef; formula-fed veal has a much blander taste. Some consumers have a marked preference for one over the other. De gustibus non disputandum est. Whether the economic and/or gastronomical benefit is sufficient to warrant the incremental discomfort caused the calves is another matter.

II. KASHRUT PROBLEMS

Lagerot Mosheh does, however, report that formula-fed calves have an inordinately high incidence of lumbar adhesions that render animals non-kosher. Ordinarily, there is no obligation to excise the internal organs, other than the lungs, of a slaughtered animal because disqualifying abnormalities are relatively rare. However, asserts Lagerot Mosheh, since it has been demonstrated that the conditions under which formula-fed calves are raised result in an extremely high rate of lung anomalies, it may well be the case that the diet and/or the living conditions to which those animals
are subjected cause abnormalities in other organs as well. Accordingly, *Iggerot Mosheh* rules that the meat of formula-fed calves may not be eaten unless the internal organs are properly examined and that pious individuals should not rely even upon such examinations. Oral reports received subsequent to publication of that responsum indicate that such examinations have been carried out upon large numbers of formula-fed calves. Those examinations have not revealed a disproportionate rate of anomalies in organs other than the lung and serve to demonstrate that the concern expressed by *Iggerot Mosheh* is without empirical basis.

More recently, questions have been raised with regard to the permissibility of eating formula-fed veal because of the ingredients of the formula. In addition to other ingredients, the formula contains significant quantities of animal fat and milk combined in powder form. The powdered formula is mixed with hot water poured into a large vat and stirred by means of an electrical implement. Rema, *Yoreh De'ah* 60:1, rules that the meat of an animal that “all its life” has been fed only forbidden foods” may not be eaten.\(^\text{16}\) Calves fed formula containing a mixture of prohibited meat and milk, it has been contended, are animals raised solely upon non-kosher food and hence, according to Rema, their meat should be prohibited. In addition, the problem is further complicated by the fact that the cooking of milk and meat together does not simply yield a foodstuff that is forbidden for consumption but results in a product which is assur be-hana’ah, i.e., from which no benefit may be derived.

Rabbi Aaron Teitelbaum, the Nerbater *Rav*, who is responsible for *kashrut* supervision of major purveyors of meat, has authored a permissive responsum dealing with those issues. Although that responsum is as yet unpublished it has been circulated among rabbinic scholars as has a rebuttal composed by R. Ya’akov Yechezkel Sofer of Toronto, Canada.

Rema, relying upon earlier authorities, limits the prohibition against eating the meat of animals that have consumed forbidden foods solely to those animals that have been fed forbidden foods exclusively because only in such cases is the animal regarded as a “yosei” or “product” of the forbidden food. However, if the animal consumes both permitted and non-permitted foods, another principle, viz., *zeh va-zeh gorem*, becomes operative. The principle of *zeh va-zeh gorem* establishes that the product of two distinct causes, one permissible and the other non-permissible, is not prohibited since it is not the *yosei* solely of the product of a forbidden entity. In the case of formula-fed calves, the animal’s development is attributable to two separate causes, one permissible and one non-permissible, and hence its meat is permitted.\(^\text{17}\)
Rambam, in his *Commentary on the Mishnah, Temurah* 6:5 and in *Hilkot Issurei Mizbeah* 3:14, clearly rejects the notion that an animal is the “yozet” or “product” of the food it consumes in ruling that animals raised even on foods from which no benefit may be derived are permitted. Rambam rules that the meat of the animal is permitted because the forbidden foodstuff becomes “changed,” i.e., it metamorphoses in the process of digestion,19 and hence, for purposes of Halakhah, the forbidden substance ceases to exist before it is turned into flesh.19 Rema, however, apparently maintains that nutrients present in the forbidden food are absorbed and metabolized before the food becomes “changed.”

Shakh, *Yoreh De'ah* 60:5, disagrees with Rema with regard to animals that have been raised entirely on food forbidden for a Jew to eat but agrees that the a prohibition if the animal is raised on *issurei bana'ah*, i.e., food from which it is forbidden to derive any benefit whatsoever, even if the animal consumes both permitted and non-permitted foodstuffs. Shakh also notes that, even in such circumstances, *Shulhan Arukh*, *Yoreh De'ah* 142:11, rules that, *post factum*, the animal’s meat is permissible unless the animal’s “primary development” had resulted from consumption of *issurei bana'ah*.20

Basing himself upon *Issur ve-Hetter be-Arukh* 47:9, *Pri Megadim, Siftei Da’at* 60:5, rules that “if it is [widely] known” that the animal has been raised solely on only non-kosher food its meat is forbidden because of *mar’it ayin*, i.e., possible confusion on the part of the onlooker.21

Rabbi Teitelbaum asserts that formula-fed veal is permissible even though the animals are raised on forbidden foods for three separate reasons:

1) Despite the fact that *Bi’ur ha-Gra, Yoreh De’ah* 60:1, concurs in the ruling of Rema, the majority of later authorities, including *Pri Hadash, Yoreh De’ah* 60:5; *Kereti u-Peleti* 60:1; *Teshuvot Penei Yeshu’u*, I, *Yoreh De’ah*, no. 4; *Da’at Torah*, *Yoreh De’ah* 60:5; *Nishmat Adam, Hilkhot Pesah*, sec. 9; *Arukh ha-Shulhan, Yoreh De’ah* 60:7; as well as R. Yitzchak Yosef, *Yalkut Yizhak*, X (Jerusalem, 5749), pp. 143-147, accept the permissive view of Shakh.22 In addition, a number of latter-day authorities extend that ruling to include even foodstuffs from which no ordinary or usual benefit may be derived but from which “unusual” benefit may be derived.23 Those authorities assert that eating meat of an animal fed such food products is not considered to be a benefit “usually” derived from the forbidden foodstuff.

2) Rabbi Teitlebaum reports that even formula-fed calves are permitted to suckle for the first seven to ten days of their lives.24 Thus, they have not been fed forbidden foods exclusively “all their lives.”
3) In addition to the forbidden meat and milk derivatives, the formula also contains a variety of innocuous ingredients. R. Dov Berish Weidenfeld, *Teshuvot Dovev Meisharim*, III, no. 50, rules that, even according to Rema, if the mixture fed to the animal contains only the “taste” of a forbidden food, i.e., the forbidden food has not been nullified by sixty equivalent measures of permitted food, the meat of the animal is permitted because the kosher portion of the mixture also contributes to the fattening of the animal with the result that the animal has not been raised on forbidden food exclusively.

Rabbi Teitlebaum’s first considerations may not be germane because *Shabbat*’s permissive view may not be applicable to formula-fed veal. *Shabbat* permits the consumption of meat of animals raised on forbidden foods but he does not sanction eating meat of animals raised on food from which no benefit may be derived. Since the formula fed to the calves contains both meat and dairy ingredients that are combined and cooked together, it may be the case that it is forbidden to derive benefit from the mixture. Even “unusual” forms of benefit may not be derived from meat and milk that have been commingled in cooking. Hence the crucial issue is whether the formula contains milk and meat derivates that have been “cooked” together.

In describing the process used in preparing the formula Rabbi Teitlebaum is somewhat unclear. In his introductory description Rabbi Teitlebaum stresses that hot water is released into a large vat and only afterward is the powder mix stirred into the water. If so, “cooking” takes place in a *kelî sheni*, i.e., a secondary utensil not in contact with fire. The general rule is that “cooking,” as generally understood in halakhic contexts, cannot take place in a secondary utensil. Even though, with regard to the prohibition against cooking that is prohibited on *Shabbat*, foodstuffs that are “easily cooked” may not be heated in a *kelî sheni*, *Teshuvot Maharil*, no. 82, indicates that the concern is limited to violation of Sabbath restrictions but does not apply in other areas of Halakhah. Hence, since it is forbidden to derive benefit only from milk and meat that have been cooked together, milk and meat heated in a secondary utensil cannot become *assur be-hana‘ah*.

However, later in his discussion Rabbi Teitlebaum indicates that, at times, additional hot water is poured into the mixed formula already present in the vat in order to raise its temperature. As recorded by *Tosafot*, *Zevahim* 95b, s.v. *irah*, there is a controversy with regard to whether a hot liquid poured from a primary utensil, i.e., a utensil heated on a stove, can effect the “cooking” of at least the upper surface to the
depth of a “peel” of the substance on which it is poured. However, Pri Megadim, Yoreh De’ah, Mishbezt Zahav 88:9, maintains that the controversy is limited to a hot liquid falling upon a solid food but that all concurred that no “cooking” occurs if the hot liquid is poured into a cold liquid. Similarly, no “cooking” occurs if the hot liquid falls upon a powder. In addition, R. Jacob of Lissa, Havvat Da’at, Bi’urim 91:7, maintains that a “peel” cannot become asur be-hana’ah because cooking only the surface of a foodstuff is not a natural or usual form of “cooking.”

Moreover, even if the thickness of a “peel” is cooked and becomes asur be-hana’ah, many authorities maintain that if the peel falls into other food and is not recognizable in the resultant mixture it is permitted to derive benefit from the mixture. Other authorities maintain that the forbidden “peel” is nullified only in a mixture sixty times as great. In addition, although some authorities differ, Shakh, Yoreh De’ah 94:22, rules that if a mixture of cooked milk and meat becomes commingled with other food the resultant mixture is not treated as milk and meat but as a conventionally prohibited foodstuff and hence that mixture is not rendered asur be-hana’ah. Furthermore, even those who differ with Shakh regarding this issue recognize that the resultant mixture is prohibited only by reason of rabbinic decree, rather than by biblical law. Hence, since there is no isur hana’ah associated with milk and meat forbidden only by virtue of the rabbinic prohibition, the resultant mixture may be fed to animals.

In light of Rabbi Teitlebaum’s premises, his discussion of whether or not the formula is asur be-hana’ah seems to be somewhat superfluous. Rabbi Teitlebaum accepts the position of Shakh who maintains that there is no restriction even ante factum upon eating meat of an animal that has been raised on forbidden foods and that the problem exists only with regard to animals raised on feed that is asur be-hana’ah. He further asserts that formula-fed calves are not raised all their lives on food that is asur be-hana’ah because they suckle cow’s milk the first seven to ten days of their lives and also because the major portion of the formula is comprised of kosher ingredients. Accordingly, it follows that, even were the formula to be deemed asur be-hana’ah, the resultant problem would certainly affect the farmer who wishes to derive benefit from the use of such formula in feeding his cows. However, since under such circumstances the meat is permitted post factum on the basis of the principle of zeh va-zeh gorem, the consumer encounters no problem in purchasing the meat.

However, a complication with regard to the post factum status of such animals arises from the fact that the proprietors of many, and probably the majority, of slaughterhouses and meat processing plants

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are non-Jews. That is certainly true with regard to the cattlemen who raise calves. As is evident from Shakh’s analysis of the ruling of Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 142:11, the meat of an animal that has been raised both on issurei hana’ah and on permissible substances is, post factum, permitted on the basis of the principle of zeh va-zeh arevu. However, purchasing such an animal from a non-Jew might well be considered to be ante factum since refraining from doing so will result in no actual financial loss to a Jew. R. Ovadia Yosef, Yabi’a Omer, VII, Yoreh De’ah, no. 7, sec. 1, demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of halakhic decisors regard a situation of that nature as post factum. It is certainly clear that if no other veal is available, or is not available at a reasonable price, all authorities would agree that the situation is to be regarded as post factum.

More significantly, Rabbi Teitelbaum’s contention that the problem is obviated by virtue of the fact that the calves suckle after birth for a period of seven to ten days invokes a consideration that is certainly subject to dispute. Shakh himself asserts that Rema’s reference to an animal that has consumed forbidden foods “all its life” is not to be understood literally but as connoting that the animal’s primary development was the product of forbidden foodstuffs.

Rabbi Sofer’s objections are based on a number of considerations that would render the formula asur be-hana’ah:

1) Pri Megadim, Orar Hayyim 318:30, maintains that “easily cooked” foodstuffs cooked in a secondary utensil are considered to be “cooked” not only for purposes of Sabbath prohibitions but also with regard to the prohibited cooking of milk and meat.

2) If the stream of hot water remains attached to its source and the powder is poured into the water, some authorities maintain that not only a “peel” of the powder is “cooked” but that the entire quantity of powder added in that manner is deemed to be “cooked.” Those authorities maintain that, in effect, each particle of powder is discrete and, since its thickness is less than that of a “peel,” each particle becomes cooked sequentially.

3) Even if the entire quantity of powder is placed in the vat before the hot water is introduced so that only a “peel” is “cooked” by the hot water, each successive “peel” is “cooked” as the powder is stirred while water is constantly added.

Rabbi Sofer further objects that it is forbidden to feed animals foodstuffs that contain even a “taste” of issur hana’ah. That objection is well-taken insofar as feeding animals is concerned. Direct benefit may not
be derived from foodstuffs containing a “taste” of issurei hana’ah because the “taste” of the forbidden substance cannot be separated from the food it permeates. However, as stated by Pri Megadim in his introduction to Hilkhot Basar be-Halav, permitted food containing a small quantity of issurei hana’ah may be sold to a non-Jew provided that the value of the issurei hana’ah is deducted from the purchase price. Similarly, insofar as an animal raised on such feed is concerned, the animal should be deemed to have been raised on a mixture of issurei hana’ah and kosher food with the result that, post factum, the meat of the animal is permitted on the basis of the principle of zeh va-zeh gorem. Rabbi Sofer fails to address the additional consideration that the calves are fed cow’s milk exclusively during the period immediately following birth.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Resolution of the question of the permissibility of veal derived from formula-fed calves is dependent upon adjudication of a number of halakhic issues:

1. The primary issue is whether the formula is asur be-hana’ah as a form of milk and meat that has been cooked together. That is unlikely to be the case for a number of reasons:
   a) It may well be the case that the “cooking” of all but a small portion of the produced formula takes place in a secondary utensil.
   b) A substantial portion of the formula consists of entirely innocuous ingredients. The consensus of halakhic opinion is that the biblical rule of hatikhah na’asit neveilah, and hence resultant issur hana’ah, does not apply to otherwise permissible foodstuffs that absorb commingled milk and meat. Accordingly, the principle of zeh va-zeh gorem would serve to negate the prohibition against deriving benefit from commingled milk and meat.

The contention that the calves are suckled for seven to ten days during the initial post-partum period is probably not a sufficient factor to render the principle of zeh ve-zeh gorem applicable but, in light of the foregoing that consideration is superfluous.

2. Assuming that the formula is not asur be-hana’ah, the second issue is whether the meat of an animal raised exclusively on forbidden foods is prohibited. That issue would arise by virtue of the presence of non-kosher tallow in the formula even if the formula did not include milk derivatives. A permissive ruling with regard to that question is contingent upon:
1) acceptance of Shakh’s view, in opposition to that of Rema and 
Bi’ur ha-Gra, that the meat of an animal raised exclusively on forbidden 
foods is not forbidden; or
2) recognition that the formula contains innocuous ingredients in 
addition to the forbidden milk and meat derivatives coupled with rejection 
of the opinion that hatikhbah na’asit neveilah applies at least by 
virtue of rabbinic decree to forbidden substances other than commingled 
milk and meat;31 or
3) the unlikely determination that suckling during the post-partum 
period is a factor sufficient enough to render the principle of zeh va-zeh 
gorem applicable.

Assuming that there is no problem of issur hana’ah resulting from 
biblically prohibited cooked milk and meat, a kashrut supervisory 
authority would be justified in relying upon the position of Shakh since 
it appears to be accepted by the majority of latter-day authorities. 
However, certification of veal raised under such conditions as glatt 
kosher is more problematic.

The term glatt, or the Hebrew halak, in its literal meaning refers to 
the fact that the lungs have been found to be “smooth,” i.e., no adhes-
sions are present that might compromise the kashrut of the animal. The 
reason for that standard is that the presence of an adhesion requires a 
determination that the adhesion is not of a nature that would render 
the animal non-kosher. Such a determination usually requires adjudication 
between conflicting halakhic opinions and also presents issues with 
regard to the method employed in removal of the adhesions prior to 
examination for a possible perforation.

The Gemara, Hullin 37b, cites Ezekiel 4:14; “. . . I have not eaten of 
neveilah or treifah from my youth until now,” and offers a remark-
able interpretation. Neveilah and treifah are forbidden to all Jews. It 
would have been unthinkable for Ezekiel to have violated those prohib-
itions. Hence, his almost boastful comment would have been entirely 
superfluous. Accordingly, the Gemara understands Ezekiel to have 
exclaimed, “I have not eaten of an animal with regard to which a scholar 
ruled,” i.e., Ezekiel, as an act of piety, refused to eat meat whose 
kashrut was the subject of any doubt even if it was ruled to be kosher by 
a competent scholar.

The term glatt in common parlance has acquired the connotation 
that food described in that manner is not in the category of behemah 
sho’orah bah hakham, i.e., a foodstuff whose kashrut was subject to 
question and whose acceptability is not contingent upon a permissive
determination by a scholar. That expanded connotation of the term *glatt* is entirely understandable since the piety adopted by Ezekiel and emulated by others was assuredly not limited to lumbar adhesions. Adhesions of the lungs are simply the most common problem requiring an opinion of a scholar with regard to the *kashrut* of the animal. Adjudication of a controversy between Rema and *Shakh* certainly entails a “ruling of a scholar” which those who adopt a *glatt* standard of *kashrut* would be unwilling to entertain.

There is one expedient that would serve to remove virtually all questions with regard to the permissibility of veal derived form formula-fed calves. A formula that contains no forbidden ingredients has been devised and patented.2 However, for reasons that are not clear but which presumably are economic in nature, that product has not been adopted by the veal industry. *Levenhei Serad*, IV, sec. 81, cited by *Pithei Teshuvah*, Torah De’ah 60:2, suggests that even if an animal is raised entirely upon forbidden foodstuffs its meat is permissible if the animal is fed permissible food exclusively “two or three days” prior to slaughter.3 Although that authority does not make a final determination with regard to this matter, he strongly inclines to that view.4 If so, feeding the calves kosher formula at least during the two or three day period preceding slaughter would obviate the problem.5

NOTES

1. The topic is also addressed by R. Gavriel Zinner, *Or Tzura‘el* (no. 30), vol. 10, no. 2 (Tevet 5765). However, this writer did not find that discussion illuminating.

2. Nevertheless, Rabbi Blumenkrantz reports that there is one brand, Tru Cup, that employs a vegetable-derived form of zinc stearate and that another brand, Win Cup, does not utilize any form of zinc stearate. In addition, Hoffy brand plates and bowls are composed of three layers. The top and bottom layers are free of non-kosher derivatives. Since styrofoam utensils are not placed directly upon the source of heat, i.e., the stove, the heat of the food does not penetrate the entire thickness and, in terms of Halakhah, does not draw a forbidden “taste” from the entire thickness of the utensil; rather, pouring a food or beverage constitutes *irui* which permeates only the exposed “shell” and hence does not permeate beyond the top layer.

3. R. Shlomoh Gross, *Or Tzura‘el* (no. 36), vol. 9, no. 4 (Tammuz 5764), p. 211, presents the issue differently and, in this writer’s opinion, less cogent-
ly. Rabbi Gross, in a parenthetical comment, suggests that only a substance that can itself become prohibited through admixture of a forbidden food can be a nullifying substance; if so, he reasons, “dirt,” which cannot become prohibited, cannot nullify. Nevertheless, Rabbi Gross also inclines to the view that nullification occurs even in such substances.

4. A comment authored by the editor of R. Jacob Kamenetsky’s Emet le-Ta’akon, Torah De’ah, no. 103, records an oral ruling by Rabbi Kamenetsky to the effect that toothpaste containing non-kosher glycerin is permissible provided that the volume of other permissible ingredients is greater, although not sixty times as great, as that of the glycerin since “it is not at all a food but a mere stone.” That elliptical comment is subject to several possible interpretations:

1) The “taste” of a non-kosher substance renders only food products non-kosher but the principle of ta’am ke-ikkar does not render non-food items impermissible. Hence, since “taste” need not be considered, nullification in a non-food substance by means of a simple rov, i.e., in a volume even marginally greater than itself, is sufficient. If so, it would follow that, if non-kosher toothpaste were to be introduced into a pot of food containing less than sixty times the quantity of glycerin in the toothpaste, the food in the pot would be rendered non-kosher.

This writer finds that understanding of Rabbi Kamenetsky’s ruling implausible because the principle of ta’am ke-ikkar means simply that, even in the presence of rov, “taste” remains intrinsically forbidden. Hence it should be forbidden regardless of the medium in which it is present.

2) Although “taste” is nullified in foodstuffs in a ratio of sixty to one, it is nullified in non-food materials and rendered entirely permissible by means of a simple “rov.” If so, Rabbi Kamenetsky agrees that “taste” can be nullified by admixture in non-food substances and further asserts that even the usual sixty to one ratio is not required.

This writer finds that understanding of Rabbi Kamenetsky’s ruling implausible as well. Since the “taste” of a prohibited food is forbidden, it is presumably forbidden in any medium in which it may be present.

3) As published, Rabbi Kamenetsky’s words admit of yet an entirely different interpretation. The phrase “it is not at all a food but a mere stone” that appears in his comment can readily be understood as referring, not to the basic non-food components of toothpaste, but to the forbidden glycerin. If so, Rabbi Kamenetsky is making a novel, but quite understandable, point, viz., forbidden foods that are tasteless do not require a sixty to one ratio for nullification. Indeed, the Gemara, Hullin 89b and 99b, records a controversy with regard to whether a forbidden sinew cooked in a mixture of less than sixty parts of permissible food renders the mixture non-kosher. The essence of that controversy is whether or not sinews are endowed with halakhically cognized “taste.” Accordingly, when the forbidden food is not endowed with any taste whatsoever, a simple rov should be sufficient for nullification. Since no “taste” is present, the forbidden, but presumably tasteless, glycerin is nullified by a simple rov. Nullification by means of rov certainly does not require that the major ingredient or ingredients be food products having taste. If so, zinc stearate, provided that it is
indeed tasteless, would also be nullified by means of a simple *rov*. If this understanding is correct, Rabbi Kamenetsky made no statement at all with regard to whether “taste” is nullified in sixty parts of a non-food substance.

It must be emphasized that this comment was not written by Rabbi Kamenetsky himself but reflects an oral ruling recorded in words other than his own. Cf., this writer’s “Letter to the Editor,” *Tradition*, vol. 31, no. 4 (Summer, 1997), pp. 80f.

5. The twenty-four hour rule applies only to “taste” but not to unabsorbed remnants of food. “Taste” that enhances flavor is forbidden but “taste” that mars the appeal of a foodstuff is not prohibited. Upon expiration of a twenty-four hour period subsequent to absorption, “taste” absorbed by a utensil is presumed to have turned and hence compromises palatability (*notten ta'am le-pegam*).

Rabbi Zinner points to the opinion of authorities cited by *Arukh ha-Shulhan*, *Tosef De’ah* 104:23, who maintain that, after a twenty-four hour period, not only “taste” absorbed in a utensil but also minute residues of foodstuffs are *notten ta'am le-pegam*, i.e., develop a permitted unpalatable flavor. However, that consideration does not render use of such a utensil permissible *ante factum*. Moreover, the permissive opinion is not accepted by *Arukh ha-Shulhan*.

Styrofoam cups are made of expandable polystyrene with the result that the expanded beads are essentially air bubbles surrounded by a relatively thin membrane. Accordingly, it has been suggested that, since “taste” is presumably not marred by mere air, the twenty-four hour rule does not apply. That suggestion is misplaced. Any zinc stearate that does not remain on the surface of the bead is absorbed in the wall of the bead and does not migrate into the empty space within and consequently is subject to any change that takes place within the wall of a utensil.

6. See also *Melechet Shalom* and *Tosefet Anshei Shem*, ad locum.


10. See *ibid.*, pp. 229–231.

11. See *ibid.*, pp. 231–235.

12. See Shabbat 105b.

13. An analogous situation not discussed by *Iggerot Moshe* or other authorities is that of a student required to perform a laboratory experiment involving infliction of pain upon an animal solely in order to satisfy course requirements. It may well be the case that a student intent upon a career in the biological sciences may justify such conduct on the grounds that the knowledge and/or skills derived from performance of the experiment is causally related to human benefit that will result from his or her acquisition of such knowledge and/or skill. However, the situation a liberal arts student engaged simply in fulfilling a science requirement necessary to obtain a baccalaureate degree is comparable to that of a person who engages in an inhumane act in order to earn a fee.
15. The phrase “all its life” is understood quite literally by Teshuvot Pnei Tehoshu’a, I, Torah De’ah, no. 4. However, Shakh, Torah De’ah 60:5 understands the phrase as connoting only that the animal’s primary development took place during the period that it was fed forbidden foodstuffs. That is also the position of Teshuvot Ma’aseh Binyamin, addenda, Hiddushei Dinim, sec. 3, and of R. Shalom Mordecai Schwadron, Da’at Torah, Torah De’ah 60:5. See also R. Shalom Toibes, Teshuvot She’ilat Shalom, Mahadura Tinyana, no. 153. Shakh further comments that the meat of the animal is forbidden if the animal “ate forbidden foods each morning all its life” even though otherwise it ate permitted foods.
16. Kenesset ha-Gedolah, followed by Teshuvot Ne’ot Desha, no. 37, and Ikkarrei ha-Dat, no. 8, sec. 6, rule that the meat of the animal is permissible if it is fed permissible food for a period of twenty-four hours prior to slaughter. That view is disputed by Da’at Torah, Torah De’ah 60:5, and is impliedly rejected by Pri Megadim, Torah De’ah, Siftei Da’at 60:5. Cf., Levushlei Serad, IV, sec. 81.
17. The majority of authorities, including Pri Megadim, Torah De’ah, Siftei Da’at 60:5 and Da’at Torah, Torah De’ah 60:5, rule that, although the meat is permitted, nevertheless, it is forbidden to cause a situation of zeh va-zeh gorem by feeding the animal forbidden foods. Cf., however, Shakh, Torah De’ah 60:5, who asserts that, according to Mordekhai, such a practice is entirely permissible. Teshuvot Bet Ta’akov, no. 1, rules that an animal raised on permitted foodstuffs that has been fed a quantity of only forbidden food that can sustain the animal for a twenty-four hour period should not be slaughtered during that twenty-four hour period.
18. Cf., Da’at Torah, Torah De’ah 60:5, who suggests that Rambam’s notion of “change” may be limited to other foodstuffs that are “changed” into flesh or fat but forbidden meat that becomes part of the body of the animal that consumes such meat does not undergo a similar metamorphosis and remains meat.
19. See also R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Orah Hayyim, I, no. 147, who adopts this view.
20. See Taz, Torah De’ah 142:17. Arukh ha-Shulhan, Torah De’ah 60:6, argues that the benefit derived from issurei hana’ah consumed by an animal is an “unusual” benefit insofar as the foodstuff is concerned and hence the meat of the animal is permissible in all circumstances unless the foodstuff was used for idolatrous purposes in which case even “unusual” benefit is forbidden. An earlier authority, Knesset ha-Gedolah cites Maharit as having been inclined to limit the prohibition to animals that have been raised on foodstuffs of avodah zarah. That opinion is also cited by Kereti u-Peleti, Peleti 60:1. Cf., however, the authorities cited infra, note 23, who maintain that the benefit derived from feeding animals such foodstuffs is not at all “unusual.”
21. See also Darkei Mosheh, Torah De’ah 81:6. However, that view is disputed by Iggerot Mosheh, Orah Hayyim, I, no. 147, anaf 6, and was earlier questioned by Da’at Torah, Torah De’ah 60:5.
22. It should be noted, however, that Bi’ur ha-Gra, Torah De’ah 60:1, cites
Sifri, Parashat Re’eh, in support of Rema’s ruling. Cf., Iggerot Mosheh, Orah Hayyim, I, no. 174, anaf 7, who rejects Gra’s interpretation of Sifri.

23. Cf., however, R. Judah Asad, Teshuvot Yehudah Ta’aleh, Orah Hayyim, no. 127, who points out that even “unusual” benefit is forbidden by rabbinic decree. Cf. also, Iggerot Mosheh, Orah Hayyim, I, no. 147, anaf 5, who challenges the contention that such benefit is “unusual.” That objection was earlier raised by R. Chaim Sofer, Teshuvot Mahaneh Hayyim, Torah De’ah, II, 20, s.v. yosei, in the name of R. Shalom Ganzfried and prompted a rather novel interpretation of Kesti’s comment by Mahaneh Hayyim.

24. Presumably, the calves are also provided with water in addition to the formula on which they are raised. Water, however, is not a nutrient and, although it is certainly a major component of every cell in the animal’s body, for halachic purposes, it is not regarded as a fattening agent that produces body tissue. We’re not the case, in light of the fact that all animals require hydration in addition to nutrition, the halachic discussions concerning animals raised on prohibited foodstuffs would be contrafactual. Cf., R. Moshe Chaim Schmerler of Zurich, Mesorah, no. XV (Tishri, 5759).

25. This is so despite the principle of hatikvah na’asit nevelah, i.e., a permitted food that absorbs that taste of a forbidden food becomes itself intrinsically forbidden. See Shelhan Arukh, Torah De’ah 92:3. According to many authorities, including Rema, Torah De’ah 93:4, that rule applies not only to milk and meat but to other forbidden foods as well. Although milk and meat that are cooked together become intrinsically forbidden as a matter of biblical law, according to most authorities, foodstuffs that absorb other types of forbidden foods become intrinsically forbidden only by virtue of rabbinic decree. See Taz, Torah De’ah 92:11 and Shabb, Torah De’ah 92:12. Cf., however, Maharik, no. 192, and sources cited by Pri Megadim, Torah De’ah, Siftei Da’at 92:12. Similarly, according to most authorities, foodstuffs that absorb the forbidden taste of milk and meat become intrinsically forbidden by virtue of rabbinic law. Although the “taste” of the absorbed milk and meat is biblically prohibited, the intrinsic prohibition of the underlying substance of a foodstuff that has absorbed milk and meat is that of biblically proscribed milk and meat. See Shabb, Torah De’ah 94:22. [Shabb also cites the conflicting view of Bah, Torah De’ah 96:3, who maintains that foodstuffs that absorb milk and meat become intrinsically forbidden by virtue of biblical law in the same manner as the commingled meat and milk itself.] Since rabbinically forbidden milk and meat is not assur behana’ah, the portion of the formula that is neither meat nor dairy serves as a goreh, or cause, from which it is not forbidden to derive benefit and hence the principle of zeh va-zeh goreh remains applicable.

However, Dorev Meisharim apparently fails to take cognizance of Rema’s ruling, Torah De’ah 93:4, to the effect that the principle of hatikvah na’asit nevelah, i.e., the entire substance of a foodstuff that absorbs a forbidden taste become intrinsically forbidden, applies not only to milk and meat cooked together but also, at least by virtue of rabbinic decree, to a mixture containing any forbidden substance. If so, to the extent that the mixture fed to the animals contains even the “taste” of non-kosher food, the entire mixture is intrinsically forbidden and hence,
according to Rema, the meat of the animal should be forbidden since it has been raised exclusively on an intrinsically forbidden foodstuff.

R. Shalom Yitzchak Z. Rambam, *Teshuvot She'ilot Shalom, Mahadura Tinyana*, no. 152, adds the interesting observation that, other than with regard to milk and meat that have been cooked together, in the opinion of some authorities, the principle of *hatikkub na'asit neveilah* is not applicable in instances in which the admixture occurred “in the hands of a non-Jew,” i.e., while owned by a non-Jew. See *Teshuvot Rema*, no. 54 and *Pri Megadim*, *Tokeh De'ah*, *Siftei Da’at* 103:14, s.v. ve-bineh.

26. Although *Dovev Meisharim* addresses a situation in which the major portion of the mixture is kosher, his reasoning would seem to apply equally to instances in which only a minor portion of the ingredients is kosher.

27. It should be noted that milk and meat of a member of a non-kosher species cooked together do not become *assur be-hana’ah*. See Shulhan Arukh, *Tokeh De’ah* 87:3. Rambam, *Commentary on the Mishnah*, *Keritut* 3:4, maintains that such is also the case with regard to the meat of an animal of a kosher species that has not been properly slaughtered. That view is accepted by R. Ezekiel Landau, *Dagul me-Revavah, Tokeh De’ah* 87:3. If so, since the tallow contained in the formula in question is derived from non-kosher sources, the formula would not become *assur be-hana’ah*. However, *Pri Megadim*, introduction to *Hilkhot Basar be-Halav*, s.v. *od*, and R. Moses Sofer, *Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, Tokeh De’ah*, no. 92, reject that view. Hence, according to those authorities, tallow obtained from a non-kosher species, when cooked with milk, becomes *assur ba-hana’ah*. Moreover, R. Akiva Eger, *Beitzah, ma’arakhah zayin*, asserts that, even for Rambam, it is only the non-kosher meat of a kosher species that does not become *assur be-hana’ah*, but that no benefit may be derived from the portion of that mixture consisting of milk cooked with such meat.

28. The meat products used in the formula are certainly derived from non-kosher animals. Nevertheless, as already indicated, *supra*, note 27, although R. Ezekiel Landau, *Dagul me-Revavah, Tokeh De’ah* 87:3, maintains that the milk cooked with non-kosher meat is not *assur be-hana’ah* that view is disputed by *Pri Megadim*, introduction to *Hilkhot Basar be-Halav*, s.v. *od* and *Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, Tokeh De’ah*, no. 92.

29. See also R. Yitzchak Yosef, *Yalkut Yosef*, X (Jerusalem, 5789), 147.

30. See *supra*, note 16.

31. See *supra*, note 25.


33. See *supra*, note 16.

34. See also R. Benjamin Adler, *Kashrut u-Treifot be-Oẓ 9:6*.

35. *Lurshiki Serad* does, however, suggest that it may be forbidden intentionally to generate a *zebo va-zeh gorem* in the same manner that it is forbidden intentionally to nullify a forbidden substance. There is, however, no restriction preventing a non-Jew from acting in that manner before selling the animal to a Jew.