In 1941, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik succeeded his late father as professor of Talmud at the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary. In 1944, he published the now famous essay *Ish ha-Halakhah* (*Halakhic Man*), an epic phenomenological study of the halakhic personality. From then on, for twenty years, almost nothing appeared until “Confrontation”—which argued the impossibility of theological interfaith dialogue—laid the ground for “The Lonely Man of Faith” a year later. This article, at one level an analysis of the perennial conflicts of the *homo religiosus*, at another a prescient critique of what has subsequently come to be known as “civil religion,” firmly established Rabbi Soloveitchik as the outstanding Orthodox philosopher of the age.

To the initiated, however, he had held that position long before. Already by 1963 he was included as one of the three Americans in Simon Noveck’s collection of *Great Jewish Thinkers of the Twentieth Century*, and Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein’s essay in that volume did much to project his thought to a wider audience. Those who were familiar with his philosophical positions at that stage knew them as *Torah she-be-al peh*, through the spoken medium of lectures, *derashot* and *shuirim*. Rabbi Lichtenstein explained that this was not to be taken as a distaste for the act of writing, but rather as a perfectionist reluctance to publish. “The fact is, that although R. Soloveitchik has published very little, he has written a great deal.” Eugene Borowitz wrote that “I have been present when he has lectured by utilizing a portion of a sizable manuscript, but no book by him has appeared.” There was an air of mystery about this submerged iceberg of the unpublished corpus, added to by such
tantalizing hints, thrown out by R. Soloveitchik himself, as “The role of the multi-valued logic in Halakhah will be discussed by me, God willing, in a forthcoming paper.” This has now been at least somewhat dispelled by the publication of The Halakhic Mind.

This, the author notes, “was written in 1944 and is being published for the first time, without any revisions or additions.” It is a remarkable work, different in kind from his other writings: a sustained exposition of epistemology and the philosophy of science, quite devoid of the dialectical tension, rhapsodic prose, anecdotal digression and exegetical innovation that so animate the rest of his oeuvre. The most technical of his writings to appear thus far, it displays a yet more awesome command of the philosophical literature than that which astounded readers of Ish ha-Halakhah. Most interesting, perhaps, is the reference in a footnote to the essay U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham, first published in 1978, which contains some of R. Soloveitchik’s most profound theological reflections. It is now clear that a draft of this essay existed in the early forties, and thus a much more complete picture of those years is beginning to emerge.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

The long period between 1944 and 1964 during which no major writings of R. Soloveitchik were published led to a conception of his thought, based solely on Ish ha-Halakhah, which had to be radically revised on the appearance of “The Lonely Man of Faith.” Here, and even more so in the essays published thirteen years later in Tradition, was an existentialism of divided selfhood and ceaseless conflict. The man of faith, wrote R. Soloveitchik, was condemned to move between the “majestic” and “covenantal” communities, “commanded to move on before he manages to strike roots in either,” an eternally wandering Aramean. Or as he was subsequently to write, yet more dramatically, “Man is a dialectical being; an inner schism runs through his personality at every level. . . . Judaic dialectic, unlike the Hegelian, is irreconcilable and hence interminable. Judaism accepted a dialectic, consisting only of thesis and antithesis. The third Hegelian stage, that of reconciliation, is missing.”

This was not what readers of Ish ha-Halakhah had expected. As Eugene Borowitz notes in reference to the earlier essay, “Most readers thought that Rabbi Soloveitchik had restated the mitnagdic, anti-Hasidic, tradition of Eastern Europe and wanted intellect, as utilized in halakhic reasoning and living, to be the central feature of
modern Jewish life. When his later papers appeared... it became
clear that the early impression was wrong. While an overarching
intellectuality is manifest in these later publications, they are con-
cerned with facing the conflicted human situation depicted by
modern existentialism, not arguing for a latter-day rationalism.”17

The discrepancies perplexed a number of commentators.18 Was
the life of faith consummated in a serene equilibrium, or destined to
remain torn and divided? Was the man of faith essentially creative
(Halakhic Man) or submissive (the Lonely Man of Faith)? Was there,
or was there not, a higher synthesis between the messages of creation
and revelation? Some suggested that in Halakhic Man, R. Sol-
oveitchik was drawing an ideal type, while in The Lonely Man, he was
projecting his personal spiritual dilemmas.19 Others argued that
Halakhic Man was only the first typological stage in the religious life,
and that his full development was closer to the Lonely Man of
Faith.20 A third possibility was that the differences could be traced to
the languages in which the various essays were published and the
audiences to which they were addressed. In his English essays,
R. Soloveitchik warned of the dangers implicit in secular culture and
argued that it must be counterbalanced by a different set of values. In
his Hebrew essays, speaking to members of the halakhic community,
he could afford to be less critical and more harmonizing.21

Nor did these exhaust the possibilities. A recent study suggests
that the difference lies between the religious personality as a general
phenomenon—man as such, facing God, the world and his fellow
man—and the halakhic personality as a specifically Jewish mode of
resolving the tensions of the former.22 Borowitz himself implied the
simplest solution. R. Soloveitchik had simply changed his mind: “We
cannot now know if there have been major shifts in his thought over
these four decades or whether the progress of his thought has come
about by slow evolution.”23

The hermeneutic problem may remain. On this, I will say more
below. But the publication of The Halakhic Mind allows us to see a
full outline of the early philosophical structure. Aviezer Ravitsky has
pointed out that Halakhic Man and U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham are
complementary studies.24 The former is an analytical treatment of the
halakhic personality, splitting it into its component parts (cognitive
man and homo religiosus). The latter is a synthetic treatment of the
same personality, moving in Hegelian dialectic through freedom
(active speculation and the search for religious experience) and
submission (to the revealed Divine command) to the ultimate union
of the Divine and human will. Halakhic Man describes human types;
U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham describes cognitive stages.
The program of *The Halakhic Mind* is essentially prior to both these enterprises. In it, R. Soloveitchik sets out his claim for the cognitive status of religion, for the methodological autonomy of the philosophy of religion, and for the primacy of Halakhah as the basic datum on which a philosophy of Judaism should be based. This looks very much like the epistemological prologue to the two other works. And if *U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham* was indeed extant at least in outline at the time, it would seem that by 1944 R. Soloveitchik had already formulated an impressively complete philosophical system along three disciplinary axes: methodology, analysis and synthesis.

**COGNITIVE PLURALISM**

The central argument of *The Halakhic Mind* is that religion constitutes an autonomous cognitive domain. R. Soloveitchik has no taste for apologetics, for the justification of religion in terms drawn from outside itself. He notes “the passionate desire of every philosopher of religion to legitimate the cognitive validity and truthfulness of religious propositions. Yet the problem of evidence in religion will never be solved. The believer does not miss philosophic legitimation; the skeptic will never be satisfied with any cognitive demonstration.”

In the past, rationalization has distorted the presentation of Judaism. R. Soloveitchik singles out for criticism—in terms highly reminiscent of Rabbis Samson Raphael Hirsch and Abraham Isaac Kook—Maimonides’ treatment, in the *Guide of the Perplexed*, of the reasons for the commandments. “In rationalizing the commandments genetically, Maimonides developed a religious ‘instrumentalism.’ Causality reverted to teleology . . . and Jewish religion was converted into technical wisdom.” Maimonides had subjected the commandments to interpretation in terms foreign to themselves. He had sought the “why” instead of the “what,” a failing he avoided in the *Mishneh Torah*.

The avoidance of rationalization does not mean the suspension of the rational. R. Soloveitchik is equally critical of religious irrationalism of the *credo quia absurdum est* kind, and of mysticism and subjectivity, of which he accuses much of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy. What, then, is the alternative? Normally there would be none. But the starting point of the book is that the twentieth century has opened up a gap between science and philosophy, and in the void thus created there is room—perhaps for the first time—for a fully autonomous religious epistemology.

The first and last sentences of *The Halakhic Mind* define the challenge: “It would be difficult to distinguish any epoch in the
history of philosophy more amenable to the mediating *homo religiosus* than that of today. . . . Out of the sources of Halakhah, a new world view awaits formulation.” The argument between is devoted to two questions: How has this happened? And what would be the shape of a religious philosophy that took advantage of it?

The answer to the first is that traditionally, philosophy and science have been allies. The result has been that “the only realm of reality to which the philosopher had access was . . . the scientifically charted universe.” This has placed religion on the defensive, having either to conform to scientific criteria of knowledge (rationalization) or be driven into escapist postures (agnosticism, mysticism). However, the Galilean-Newtonian physics on which philosophy from Descartes to the neo-Kantians is premised, has been supplanted by the counter-intuitive phenomena of modern science: relativity, quantum mechanics and non-Euclidian geometry. This poses a crisis for philosophy which Bergson was the first to diagnose. The result has been the emergence of epistemological pluralism.

This pluralism arises from the fact that concepts in the new sciences neither mirror ordinary experience nor remain constant between disciplines. Thus ‘space’ might mean one thing to the mathematician, another to the physicist, and a third in ordinary experience. Philosophy cannot postulate a unified conceptual world and at the same time embrace modern science. But therein lies the great liberation, for “as long as general philosophy explored a quantitatively constructed universe, the philosophy of religion could not progress.” Now there opens up an alternative to the scientific description of reality, namely one which focuses on the qualitative aspects of experience. This is where religious experience belongs, in the “concrete world full of color and sound.”

R. Soloveitchik insists that the “non-scientific” character of religion does not signify that it is non-cognitive. To the contrary: “The *homo religiosus* must regain his position in the cognitive realm.” Against several modern philosophies of religion, R. Soloveitchik argues that the believer is concerned not with a transcendental domain, but with the here-and-now viewed from a religious perspective; not with interpreting God in terms of the world but the world under the aspect of God. The task of a new philosophy of religion would be to uncover its distinctive conceptuality, probing what “time,” “space,” “causality” and so on mean within its world. Hence the conclusion of the first half of the argument, that for the first time in the history of thought religion can be presented autonomously, as a cognitive system independent of but parallel to science.
FROM OBJECTIVE TO SUBJECTIVE

The question now arises: how should such a philosophy proceed? R. Soloveitchik proposes two criteria. The first is practical, or more strictly, ethical. “Epistemology would do well to cast aside such canonized concepts as objectivity and ethical neutrality and survey philosophical doctrines from a subjective, normative standpoint.” Such considerations militate against irrationalism, subjectivism and mysticism, for these lead in the end to moral corruption. “It is no mere coincidence that the most celebrated philosophers of the third Reich were outstanding disciples of Husserl.”

The second is theoretical. The philosophy of religion should imitate the method of modern science, namely “reconstruction” or sensing the whole within the parts. “The structural designs of religion cannot be intuited through any sympathetic fusion with an eternal essence, but must be reconstructed out of objective religious data and central realities.” Religion may proceed, like art, from subjective experience to objectified forms, but it must be explored in the reverse direction. One may try to gain an insight into the inner world of the artist by examining his works, but the reverse is impossible: from a precise description of his inner state one could not infer the art he will produce. So too in religion. The subjective can only be reconstructed from the objective, the actual forms in which it is concretized in specific traditions. Of these forms, the “cult” is to be preferred to the “ethos” as being more indicative of the unique character of a particular religion.

R. Soloveitchik thus has a series of objections against religious subjectivism which he summarizes as follows. First, it fails to satisfy the homo religiosus, who seeks more than inward experience. He wants ethical guidance and a religious community. Second, subjective religion has no defenses against barbarism, to which it frequently descends. Third, it renders religion esoteric and non-democratic. “Aristocracy in the religious realm is identical with the decadence of religion.” Religious liberalism errs by proceeding in the wrong direction, from subjectivity to objectivity. But in reality there is no pristine religious subjectivity: “If one seeks primordial subjectivity he would find an evanescent flux, neither religious nor mundane, but, similar to Aristotelian matter, unregulated and chaotic.”

The only valid procedure is to travel inwards from the objectified forms of religion, beginning with the received text of revelation. “The canonized Scripture serves as the most reliable standard of reference for objectivity.” The halakhic tradition is perfectly suited to this role. “Objectification reaches its highest expression in the Halakhah. Halakhah is the act of seizing the subjective flow and
converting it into enduring and tangible magnitudes. . . . In short, Halakhah is the objectifying instrument of our religious consciousness, the form-principle of the transcendental act, the matrix in which the amorphous religious hylo is cast.41

_The Halakhic Mind_ ends by dissociating itself from medieval Jewish philosophy. Firstly, the latter never succeeded in shaping the experience of the majority of the Jewish community. Secondly, it is rooted in non-indigenous sources, ancient Greek and medieval Arabic. Thirdly, it cannot meet the requirement of living continuity, since its concepts are by now outmoded. An autonomous Jewish philosophy is possible and necessary, and it can only be constructed on the basis of Halakhah.

**HALAKHIC MIND AND HALAKHIC MAN**

Such, then, is the argument of the book. What impressions does it leave? First, it is obviously close in spirit to the work undertaken in _Ish ha-Halakhah_. The two books share an admiration for modern mathematics and theoretical physics as cognitive paradigms, and seek to establish their kinship with a philosophy based on Halakhah. There are differences. The _homo religiosus_ of _The Halakhic Mind_ is not that of _Ish ha-Halakhah_, but this is a matter of terminology rather than substance. The project of the two books is altogether different. _Ish ha-Halakhah_ describes Halakhic Man from the inside; _The Halakhic Mind_ establishes the philosophical significance of such a description. It belongs, in other words, to the world of the footnotes of the early part of _Ish ha-Halakhah_ and constitutes a kind of systematic introduction to it. The two books differ in style and tone too. _The Halakhic Mind_ is a sober philosophical work, and the persuasive, evocative style of _Ish ha-Halakhah_ would have been irrelevant to its purpose. But the setting is the same in both cases: a sense that romantic religion and philosophical subjectivism have failed, and that the need is for a presentation of religion as a form of cognitive, disciplined perception.

Second, _The Halakhic Mind_ is not a prologue to _Ish ha-Halakhah_ alone but to an entire program, a new kind of Jewish philosophy. This would undertake to gather the entire corpus of objectified Jewish spirituality—Biblical text, halakhic literature, liturgy, mysticism and so on—and seek its subjective correlative. “Out of this enormous mass of objectified constructs, the underlying subjective aspects could gradually be reconstructed.”42 In the light of this, both early works, together with _U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham_, are merely introductory. A good example of the detailed work one would
expect, having read *The Halakhic Mind*, would be the lectures gathered in *Al ha-Teshuvah*, where a particular body of halakhah is treated to "subjective reconstruction." There is thus every reason to suppose that R. Soloveitchik has been faithful to the call he issued in those early years, and that his "philosophy" is to be found as much in his analysis of texts as in his more overtly philosophical statements.

Third, there is a surprising but unmistakable echo of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch in the book's closing pages. There is the same attack on Maimonides and others (Mendelssohn for Hirsch, Hermann Cohen for R. Soloveitchik) for interpreting Judaism through non-Jewish concepts. There is the same call "to know Judaism out of itself." Hirsch writes that "the Bible... should be studied as the foundation of a new science. Nature should be contemplated with the spirit of David." For "Bible" read "Halakhah" and we have the program of *The Halakhic Mind*. R. Soloveitchik's critique of religious liberalism is mounted on the same foundation as Hirsch's critique of the Science of Judaism, namely that any philosophical study of Judaism must live in the details of text and command and be built bit by bit through an extended effort of exegesis.

Indeed, even the weaknesses of *The Halakhic Mind* mirror those of Hirsch. There is the same equivocation between a penetrating methodological critique of Reform and a quite disparate ethical denunciation. Both see humanism as prone to corruption, religious liberalism as arbitrary; both attack the elitism of rarified theologies. Though the temperaments of the two men could not be more different, they share the same movement from emancipation to self-emancipation. The epistemological pluralism with which *The Halakhic Mind* begins is a kind of metaphysical equivalent to the social processes experienced by Hirsch in mid-nineteenth century Germany. Both create space for Judaism to be itself.

Fourth, inevitably, the book has a somewhat dated feel about it. For those raised in the atmosphere of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, philosophical pluralism is not the Copernican revolution it may have seemed forty years ago. Nor is science, after T. S. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), the pristine outlook—cognition, control, creation—came to seem, to R. Soloveitchik of "The Lonely Man of Faith," a more threatening force than the subjective religiosity he attacked in *The Halakhic Mind* and *Ish ha-Halakhah*. Had Hans Georg Gadamer's *Truth and Method* (1960) been available two decades earlier, one of the central arguments of *The Halakhic Mind* (the opposition between physics and modern humanistic sciences) might not have been necessary. None
of this is to say that R. Soloveitchik’s case has been rendered obsolete. To the contrary, it has been reinforced to the point where it may have been rendered redundant. But the book will remain invaluable as his most explicit methodological statement, his point of departure, the external justification he gave for his long journey inward to a disciplined Jewish subjectivity.

LIBERATION AND PRIVATION

*The Halakhic Mind* is a deeply impressive work, furnishing new evidence of Rabbi Soloveitchik’s unrivalled mastery of secular sources and disclosing a tone of voice we had not heard before, the Dr. Soloveitchik of Berlin rather than the Rav of Yeshiva University. It will raise two questions: Does it succeed in its own terms, in providing a philosophical justification for the cognitive autonomy of religion? And, what light does it shed on Soloveitchik’s other works and his intellectual development? Both are beyond the scope of this review and the competence of this reviewer. Some tentative speculations, though, seem inescapable.

First, R. Soloveitchik insists at critical stages of the argument that the pluralism he is endorsing is nonetheless a form of *realism*. It corresponds to something real in the world. It is not pragmatism. It does not deny the absolute character of Being. “Teleological heterogeneity . . . does not invalidate the cognitive act, for, in the final analysis, pluralism is founded on reality itself. . . . Pluralism asserts only that the object reveals itself in manifold ways to the subject, and that a certain *telos* corresponds to each of these ontical manifestations.”

Yet the very force of the argument suggests that reality can be sliced up and interpreted in infinitely many ways. And if reality corresponds to each of them, is it significant to say that it corresponds to any? This is the conclusion reached by Richard Rorty in his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1980), a work which in many ways parallels *The Halakhic Mind*. Rorty’s remarks on the implications of twentieth-century philosophy are directly relevant and challenging. “It would make for philosophical clarity if we just gave the notion of ‘cognition’ to predictive science, and stopped worrying about ‘alternative cognitive methods.’ The word *knowledge* would not seem worth fighting over were it not for the Kantian tradition that to be a philosopher is to have a ‘theory of knowledge’.”

Closely related to this is R. Soloveitchik’s demonstration that religion is indeed cognitive, namely that its mental acts are intentional or “coordinated with an object.” He alludes, in footnotes, to
the problematic nature of this demonstration. Brentano denied that intentional acts were cognitive; Scheler disagreed; R. Soloveitchik declares his indebtedness to Scheler. But this spreads the net of cognition very wide indeed—to all mental acts—and would not justify the conclusion that he wants to reach, namely, that some forms of religion are more cognitive than others, halakhic Judaism most of all.

This relates to another ambivalence, here as elsewhere in R. Soloveitchik’s work, between the universal and the particular. Is The Halakhic Mind about religion or about Judaism? Is the homo religiosus portrayed in its pages religious man tout court, or the Jew? He is “an enthusiastic practicioner of the cognitive act”; he is a “social being”; he seeks ethical guidance and wants to change the world rather than accept it. In short, he has a predisposition to welcome halakhic Judaism. R. Soloveitchik seeks to demonstrate the autonomy of religion as cognition, and then to establish Judaism as the supreme example. But he has provided an argument for the autonomy and incommensurability of religions in the plural, so that the success of the first part of the argument must ipso facto weaken the second. He testifies to this at one stage by saying that sometimes one must choose one’s philosophy “from a subjective, normative viewpoint.” There is a straight road from The Halakhic Mind to the argument in “Confrontation” that there is no ultimate dialogue between religions since “the numinous character and the strangeness of the act of faith of a particular community . . . is totally incomprehensible to the man of a different faith community.”

These are all symptoms of the dual direction of R. Soloveitchik’s thought, projecting the autonomy and cognitive integrity of the halakhic system on the one hand, arguing its supremacy over other systems on the other. The former embraces pluralism, the latter rejects it. Which brings us back to our starting-point: the relation between R. Soloveitchik’s early work and his later, more pessimistic and conflicted essays.

The transition from nineteenth-century liberalism to twentieth-century pluralism—both terms construed in their widest sense—seemed to promise much to religious orthodoxy. Instead of having to justify itself at the bar of an enlightenment universal religion or ethic, it could declare independence without forfeiting rationality. Did not the multiplicity of models of knowledge, of which mathematics and science provided ample examples, show that even within the “hard” disciplines there was methodological pluralism? The life of faith too had to be understood on its own terms, in its own concepts, rather than be subjected to the disciplines of science, history, anthropology
and psychology. This was liberation indeed, and *The Halakhic Mind* bespeaks the mood.

But the pluralism of knowledge was mirrored in society. It had correlatives in the real world. The single universe of pre-modernity—the universe inhabited by Maimonides, in which the God of Abraham and of Aristotle were indeed one; the universe in which science, philosophy and religion competed in a single arena; the universe whose last Jewish inhabitant was Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook—was shattered. In its place were not merely pluralities of thought-worlds, but of identities, roles and lifestyles as well. Consider the markers of modernity invoked by one major sociological study: “plurality of life-worlds,” “dichotomy of public and private spheres” and “multi-relational synchronization.” Personal identity is “peculiarly open, differentiated, reflective, individuated.” Modern man is afflicted with a “permanent identity crisis,” and suffers “from a deepening condition of ‘homelessness’.” This world is instantly recognizable. It is the world of “The Lonely Man of Faith.”

R. Soloveitchik makes an important point at the beginning and end of *The Halakhic Mind*. Judaism is timeless and autonomous. But how much of it can be expressed in the language of the world depends on where the world is at a given point in time. The pluralism of contemporary culture, which he was the first to recognize, was both a liberation and a privation. It liberated tradition from having to vindicate itself in alien terms. But it prized tradition from its moorings in the collective order and made it seem as just one system among many, either consciously chosen (the *ba’al teshuvah* phenomenon) or validated by an act of faith which is “aboriginal, exploding with elemental force” and eluding cognitive analysis. R. Soloveitchik’s genius and the poignancy of his intellectual development are both evidenced in this: that he was the first to explore the positive possibilities of the liberation, and the first to chart the tragic dimension of the privation.

NOTES

6. Ibid., p. 287.
10. “[Halakhic Man’s] affective life is characterized by a fine equilibrium, a stoic tranquillity” (*Halakhic Man*, translated by Lawrence Kaplan, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983, p. 77). One of the more interesting things about *Halakhic Man*, with its passionate rhetoric, is that it could not have been written by Halakhic Man.
11. Note 98, p. 130.
12. First published in *Ha-Darom* 47 (Tishri 5739), pp. 1–83; subsequently in *Ish ha-Halakhah—Galuy ve-Nistar*, Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1979, pp. 115–235. The section on shinnui and hidduesh to which R. Soloveitchik alludes in *The Halakhic Mind* is to be found in the latter, pp. 204–207.
13. Aviezer Ravitsky notes that an early version of *U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham*, under the title *Ish ha-Elohim*, was “already written in the years following the appearance of *Ish ha-Halakhah*.” See “Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik on Human Knowledge: Between Maimonidean and neo-Kantian Philosophy,” *Modern Judaism* 6:2 (May 1986), pp. 157–188, note 17. The present version was clearly written later, and is perhaps a reworking of several papers.
17. *Choices in Modern Jewish Thought*, p. 223.
18. In addition to the articles cited below, see David Hartman, *A Living Covenant*, The Free Press, 1985, pp. 60–88. In his early writings, Hartman argues, R. Soloveitchik was “struggling to present halakhic man as an attractive model for Orthodox Judaism in the modern era” (p. 71). In his later writings he “senses that if there were a total translation of the halakhic experience into Western rational categories, commitment to halakhah would be weakened” (pp. 84–85). For much of the rest of the book, Hartman takes issue with the turn in R. Soloveitchik’s thought.
20. Lawrence Kaplan, “The Religious Philosophy of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik,” *Tradition* 14:2 (Fall 1973), pp. 43–64, on the basis of the essay *Al Ahavat ha-Torah u-Ge’ulat Nefesh ha-Dor*.
22. Ravitsky, loc. cit.
29. R. Soloveitchik offers here a fascinating analysis of Maimonides’ use of the term *remez* (*M.T. Teshuvah* 3:4; *Mikva’ot* 11:12) as signifying “descriptive hermeneutics.”
31. Ibid., p. 6.
32. Ibid., p. 32.
33. Ibid., p. 40.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 52.
36. Ibid., p. 53.
37. Ibid., p. 62.
38. Ibid., p. 80.
39. Ibid., p. 90.
40. Ibid., p. 81.
41. Ibid., p. 85.
42. Ibid., p. 91.
44. Ibid.
47. For some other questions, see Steven S. Schwarzschild’s review of The Halakhic Mind in Sh'ma, 1986, pp. 127–8.
48. The Halakhic Mind, p. 16.
51. Ibid., p. 52.