The question of maternal identity in situations involving a host mother as well as the issue of maternal identity in instances of in vitro fertilization have been addressed in this column on two separate occasions.\(^1\) In vitro techniques are employed when it is not possible for a woman to become pregnant by natural means because of her inability to produce viable ova, because of a blockage of the fallopian tubes, because the husband suffers from an inability to produce a sufficient number of sperm or because pregnancy has not occurred in utero for other, sometimes unknown, physiological reasons. When normal ovulation does occur an ovum or, more commonly, a multiple number of ova are removed from the ovaries. The ova are then fertilized in a petri dish by sperm ejaculated by the husband and, after undergoing a number of cell divisions, the developing zygote is inserted into the uterus of the woman from whom the ovum was removed. If, however, the woman cannot produce viable ova an ovum, or a multiple number of ova, may be donated by a relative or stranger, fertilized by means of an in vitro procedure and inserted into the uterus of the otherwise infertile woman and carried to term. When the fertility problem arises from the woman’s inability to sustain a pregnancy for the full period of gestation the fertilized zygote may be implanted in the uterus of another woman, i.e., a host mother, who will carry the fetus to term. In each of these cases there is some question with regard to whether the genetic mother or the gestational mother is regarded as the child’s mother for matters in which such a relationship is significant in Jewish law, e.g., consanguinity, inheritance, laws of mourning, etc.

Although there is a minority view that regards the donor mother as the sole mother of a child born of in vitro fertilization,\(^2\) the consensus of rabbinic opinion is that a maternal-filial relationship is generated between the gestational mother and the child, despite the absence of any genetic relationship, by virtue of parturition alone.\(^3\) Whether or not the genetic mother, i.e., the woman who produced the ovum from which the child was conceived, is also a mother from the vantage point of Jewish law is a more complex question. The question of whether the baby may, in effect, have two halakhic mothers must be regarded as yet open.\(^4\)

I. ABSENCE OF A MATERNAL RELATIONSHIP

R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Ziz Eli’ezer, XV, no. 45,\(^5\) has advanced the novel view that, in the eyes of Halakhah, a child born of in vitro fertilization has neither a father nor a mother even if the biological mother and the gestational mother are one and the same, as is the case in the majority of instances in which in vitro procedures are employed. Rabbi Waldenberg’s arguments, which are not based upon cited precedents or analogy to other halakhic provisions, are
three in number: 1) Fertilization in the course of an in vitro procedure occurs in an "unnatural" manner through the intermediacy of a "third power" extraneous to the father or mother, i.e., the petri dish. 2) Conception occurs in a manner "that has no relationship to genealogy." 3) In natural reproduction the ovum remains "attached" to the body and is fertilized therein. Maternal identity is consequent solely upon fertilization that occurs while the ovum is yet attached to the mother’s body. Thus, upon "severance" and removal of the ovum from the mother’s body any genealogical relationship between the ovum and the mother is destroyed.

To this writer, those arguments appear to be without substance. In response to the first argument it must be stated that the petri dish is not a "third power" and in no way contributes biologically or chemically to the fertilization process. It is simply a convenient receptacle designed to provide a hospitable environment in which fertilization may occur. Rabbi Waldenberg’s second argument, if indeed he intended to present it as an independent argument, is entirely conclusory. In order to demonstrate that no maternal relationship exists some evidence or argument must be presented that would serve to demonstrate that genealogical relationships are generated solely in utero. Rabbi Waldenberg provides no such demonstration. Whatever cogency the third argument may have is lost if it is recognized that parturition, in and of itself, establishes a maternal relationship.

In the early days of in vitro fertilization a position similar to that advanced by Rabbi Waldenberg was presented by R. Judah Gershuni in the Tishri 5739 issue of Or ha-Mizrah. Rabbi Gershuni’s argument is based upon a statement of Divrei Malki’el, IV, no. 107. There is a significant disagreement among rabbinic authorities with regard to whether a paternal relationship may occur as a result of artificial insemination or whether such a relationship can arise only as the result of a sexual act. Divrei Malki’el expresses tentative support for the latter position but does so on the basis of the novel view that "once the semen has been emitted and has warmth only because of the ministration of the physician and his skill with the pipette or due to the heat of the bath" a baby born as a result of that process is not regarded as the son of the donor. Although Divrei Malki’el stands virtually alone in developing this argument and himself concludes that a child born of artificial insemination is indeed the child of the donor, Rabbi Gershuni observes that a fertilized zygote sustained in a petri dish by means of "artificial nutrition and blood serum" should not be regarded by Jewish law as the child of either parent. The earlier presented rebuttal of Rabbi Waldenberg’s argument applies with equal force to that advanced by Rabbi Gershuni. Moreover, any cogency the argument may have with regard to establishment of a paternal relationship notwithstanding, if parturition, in and of itself, serves to establish a maternal relationship, the sources of antecedent nutrition of the fetus are totally irrelevant.

II. PARTURITION AS A DETERMINANT

The view that the maternal relationship is predicated upon parturition is based upon the statement of the Gemara, Yevamot 97b, to the effect that a fraternal relationship exists between male twins born to a woman who converts to Judaism during the course of her pregnancy. Since a proselyte is regarded as a "newly born child" and all halakhic relationships with existing blood relatives are severed upon conversion, the relationship of the child to its mother, and through her to its twin sibling, cannot be regarded as having arisen at the moment of conception. From the vantage point of Halakhah, the situation of a pregnant convert is analogous to that of a woman who receives an ovum into her uterus that has been fertilized outside of her body. Upon conversion, all relationships with relatives, including her own fetus, are severed. Accordingly, the status of her fetus at the moment of conversion is precisely identical to that of a fetus that is abruptly
thrust into her uterus, i.e., a fetus that has not been conceived within her body. Clearly then, since a maternal relationship is recognized by Jewish law in the case of a pregnant convert, it must be the process of parturition that, at least in such instances, establishes the maternal relationship. If so, it follows that the site in which fertilization occurs or the provenance of the ovum is irrelevant; parturition, in and of itself, establishes a mother-child relationship. This principle is also reflected in the observation of Tosafot, Ketubot 11a, to the effect that the fetus of a pregnant women who undergoes conversion is itself a convert but nevertheless inherits its mother’s estate. Quite obviously the child can be an heir only if a maternal-filial relationship has been established and in the case of a pregnant proselyte that relationship can come into being only by virtue of parturition.

It might, however, be argued that although this source amply demonstrates that generation of the ovum is not the definitive criterion of the existence of a maternal relationship, nevertheless, it may be gestation rather than parturition that constitutes the factor serving to establish such a relationship. The convert would then be considered to be the mother of the child on the basis of having nurtured the fetus in her womb during the post-conversion period of gestation. This would lead to the conclusion that a naturally conceived fetus that is subsequently transferred from the womb of one woman to that of another would have two mothers for purposes of Halakhah. There are, however, aggadic sources that speak of the intrauterine transfer of Dinah from the womb of Rachel to Leah and of Joseph from Leah to Rachel. Subsequent scriptural references to Dinah as the daughter of Leah and of Joseph as the son of Rachel ostensibly indicate that each child had but a single mother. If so, it must be parturition, rather than gestation, that establishes the maternal relationship. Of course, aggadic sources are not dispositive with regard to matters of Halakhah and, accordingly, the matter cannot be regarded as entirely resolved.

III. GESTATION AS A DETERMINANT

In an article published in Tehumin, vol. V (5744), R. Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg cites one significant source in support of the position that gestation establishes a maternal relationship even prior to parturition and, accordingly, that source would support the conclusion that a woman who carries a fetus in her womb for any portion of the gestational period—at least during the last two trimesters of pregnancy—is regarded as the baby’s mother for purposes of Halakhah.

The Gemara, Hullin 113b, declares that the biblical prohibition against cooking and eating commingled milk and meat is not attendant upon meat cooked with the milk removed from an animal that has been slaughtered. Milk derived from a slaughtered animal is excluded from the prohibition because, according to talmudic exegesis of the verse “you shall not cook a kid in the milk of its mother” (Exodus 23:19; Exodus 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21), the biblical prohibition applies only to the milk of an animal “that has the capacity to become a mother” (re’uyah lehiyot em). Obviously, a dead animal can no longer bear a child and hence lacks the capacity to become a mother.

In his notes on Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 87:6, R. Akiva Eger queries whether the milk of a live animal that is a treifah is similarly excluded from the prohibition. The talmudic principle is that a treifah, (i.e., an animal that suffers from one of a number of specified anatomical defects either congenitally or as the result of trauma causing loss or perforation of the organ) cannot conceive and carry a fetus to term. Hence, comments R. Akiva Eger, since a treifah cannot become a mother, it might be assumed that the milk of a treifah is excluded from the prohibition against cooking or consuming commingled milk and meat. Nevertheless, R. Akiva Eger cites a statement of the Gemara, Sanhedrin 69a, to the effect that a male who has sired a fetus is to be termed a “father” immediately upon
expiration of the first trimester of pregnancy. If the male parent of a fetus is a "father" it would stand to reason that the female parent is similarly to be regarded as a "mother." As applied to the question before him, R. Akiva Eger remarks that the talmudic reference to a parental relationship vis-à-vis a fetus may be limited to a relationship with a viable fetus and hence, since the fetus of a treifah is not viable, there may well be no halakhic relationship between the fetus of a treifah and its gestational mother. Nevertheless, it would appear that, in the case of a viable fetus, such a relationship does indeed exist. Thus R. Akiva Eger's comment serves to establish that the gestational mother is a mother in the eyes of Jewish law. However, insofar as a child born of in vitro fertilization is concerned, since the Gemara recognizes a paternal relationship only subsequent to the expiration of the first trimester and R. Akiva Eger equates inception of the maternal relationship with that of the paternal relationship, R. Akiva Eger's comments do not serve to establish the existence of a halakhically recognized relationship with the genetic mother. By virtue of the nature of in vitro fertilization, the physiological relationship between the donor of the unfertilized ovum and the fetus is severed long before the end of the first trimester of pregnancy.

Rabbi Goldberg points out that R. Akiva Eger's position is contradicted by at least one authority. R. Joseph Engel, Bet ha-Ozar, erekh av, argues that, although the sire of a fetus is a "father," nevertheless the female carrying the fetus in her womb is not recognized as a "mother" in the eyes of Jewish law until the moment of parturition. The Gemara, Megillah 13a, notes the redundancy inherent in the phrases "for she did not have a father or a mother" and "upon the death of her father and her mother" (Esther 2:7) and indicates that the second phrase is designed to convey additional information to the effect that Esther did not have a father or mother for even a single day. The Gemara comments that Esther's father died as soon as her mother conceived and that her mother perished upon her birth. The Gemara carefully spells out that Esther is described as never having had a father because her father died following conception before he could properly be termed a "father," i.e., before the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, and that she is described as never having had a mother despite the fact that her mother survived until the end of the gestational period. Esther is described as not having a mother because her mother died in childbirth. Hence this talmudic passage clearly indicates that a woman may properly be termed a "mother" only upon parturition. Presumably, the distinction between the male and female parent is based upon the fact that the male's role in reproduction ceases upon fertilization of the ovum and, accordingly, he is termed a "father" as soon as the fetus has reached a significant stage of development, whereas the female's role remains incomplete until the moment of birth. Why R. Akiva Eger ignored the discussion in Megillah is unclear. He may have regarded that discussion as aggadic in nature and hence as not being a proper source for derivation of a halakhic principle.

It should also be noted that the comments of Maharal of Prague in his explication of this verse in his commentary on the Book of Esther suggest that he understood the Gemara's statement as being predicated upon the position that a fetus is an integral part of the mother (ubar yerekh imo). It then follows that during gestation mother and fetus constitute an undivided entity; accordingly, the maternal progenitor cannot become a "mother" until a physiological separation occurs, i.e., parturition. If, however, the opposing view is adopted and the fetus is not regarded as an integral part of the mother (ubar lav yerekh imo) there is no reason to assume, according to Maharal, that the maternal relationship is established any differently from the paternal relationship with the result that according to that view the maternal-filial relationship is established at a much earlier stage of gestation.
IV. DUAL MATERNAL RELATIONSHIPS

Although, as discussed earlier, there is strong evidence supporting the position that parturition serves to determine maternal relationship, those sources serve only to establish that parturition establishes a maternal-child relationship but do not preclude the possibility that Halakhah may recognize two or more maternal relationships, i.e., a relationship arising from parturition and an additional relationship or relationships arising from gestation or provision of a gamete.21

The possibility of “doubtful” dual maternal relationships is raised in one recent discussion of this issue, albeit on the basis of entirely different considerations. A talmudic discussion regarding a similar quandary in the area of agricultural law is cited by Professor Ze’ev Low, Emek Halakhah, II (Jerusalem, 5749), 165–169, as reflecting the principle to be employed in resolving the issue of maternal identity. It is forbidden to consume newly harvested grain crops until the omer has been offered in the Temple on the second day of Passover. That offering renders permissible not only already harvested grain but also grain in the field that has taken root but which has, as yet, not fully matured. Any crop planted subsequent to the offering of the omer does not become permissible for use as food until the following Passover. The Gemara, Menahot 69b, posits a situation in which a stalk of grain is planted and has reached a stage of development equal to a third of its ultimate growth (i.e., the stage at which the produce has reached a state of maturity at which it is recognized, for halakhic purposes, as a grain product); having reached this stage of development, the stalk is removed from the ground before the omer is offered and replanted after the offering of the omer whereupon it continues to mature and ultimately reaches its normal state of growth. The question posed by the Gemara is whether the omer renders the entire plant permissible since the primary growth of the stalk occurred before the time of offering of the omer or whether, because of its enhanced growth subsequent to the offering of the omer, the produce may not be eaten. The Gemara identifies a similar problem with regard to orlah, the fruit of a tree that is forbidden during the first three-year period after planting. The problem involves a situation in which a young sapling already bearing fruit is grafted onto a mature tree and that fruit subsequently greatly increases in size. The question is whether the newly grown portion of the fruit produced by the grafted sapling is to be regarded as the product of the mature tree and hence permissible or whether, since the identity of the fruit has been established as orlah prior to grafting, the newly grown portion of the fruit is also infused with that identity. A third problem occurs with regard to kilayim, produce that is forbidden because of mingling in the planting of diverse species. The situation discussed by the Gemara involves a vegetable that has been planted in a vineyard; the vines are then uprooted and the vegetable continues to grow after the vine has been removed. Both the vegetable and the grapes become forbidden upon mingling of the species in planting. The question is whether the additional growth of the vegetable subsequent to removal of the grape vine is permissible since that portion of the vegetable was never commingled with grapes or whether the identity of the vegetable was established as forbidden produce upon its planting in the vineyard and hence all subsequent growth acquires the same identity.

A number of talmudic commentators make it clear that they regard the issue in each of these related cases, not as involving a question concerning the admixture of a small quantity of a forbidden foodstuff with a much larger quantity of a permitted foodstuff, as might perhaps be presumed, but as a question of determination of identity in cases in which there is continued growth and development. Is the identity of a stalk of grain determined with finality as soon as it is halakhically recognized as grain? If so, then, having acquired identity and status as grain before the offering of the omer, it retains the identity of “pre-omeric”
(and hence presently permissible) grain even if a significant portion of its growth occurs after the offering of the omer; much in the same manner that we regard a person who gains a considerable amount of weight to be the same person after the weight-gain as before or in the manner that we regard an infant who grows to adulthood as retaining the same identity he possessed as a child. Or do we regard the portion of the grain added as a result of accretion or incremental growth of the grain as having an independent identity since that growth occurs subsequent to a second "post-omeric" (and hence as yet forbidden) planting? Has the identity of the fruit of the sapling been irreversibly determined upon its first appearance so that it predetermines the identity of the even much greater portion of the fruit that develops after grafting with the result that the entire fruit is forbidden orlah or does the added portion of the fruit that grows after grafting have its own identity as a permitted fruit? A vegetable planted in a vineyard acquires identity as a forbidden planting of diverse species. But does that identity infuse even the portion of the vegetable that comes into being after the grapevine is removed or does the newly developing portion of the vegetable acquire an identity of its own, viz., an identity as a vegetable that has not been compromised by diverse planting in a vineyard? These questions are left unresolved by the Gemara with the result that, in any given case, the stringencies of both possible resolutions of the issue must be applied, i.e., the grain is forbidden because of the possibility that the previously-acquired status does not control the enhanced growth of the grain, but the fruit of the grafted sapling and the increased growth of the vegetable are forbidden because the earlier acquired identity may indeed control the identity of that which is a natural outgrowth of the old.

If this analysis of these talmudic questions is accepted as correct, the question of maternal identity of progeny born as the result of in vitro fertilization of a donated ovum may be regarded as analogous. Maternal identity is established in the first instance by production of the gamete. The question is whether that determination is also dispositive with regard to the identity of the fetus whose later physical development is attributable to the gestational host or whether the identity of the developing fetus is derived from its nurturer, viz., the host mother, in which case the child could be regarded as having two mothers just as, for example, a single grain of wheat may be, in part, "pre-omeric" and, in part, "post-omeric." Since the Gemara leaves the basic issue unresolved and, accordingly, rules that the stringencies of both possible identities must be applied, a child born of in vitro fertilization, on the basis of this analogy, would to all intents and purposes be regarded as having two mothers.

However, the analogy does not resolve the issue in its entirety. Presented in this manner it assumes as axiomatic that, in the first instance, motherhood is genetically determined but that the original relationship can perhaps be nullified by establishment of a subsequent maternal relationship. The thrust of the analogy is to establish that the earlier relationship is not extinguished. The crux of the question, however, is whether Halakhah at all recognizes a maternal relationship based upon donation of an ovum, i.e., a relationship based solely upon genetic considerations. That is an issue with regard to which there may well be no evidence in rabbinic sources. Only after it is established that there exists halakhic cognizance of a maternal relationship based upon donation of an ovum can the question of possible subsequent nullification or supersedure be addressed. Nevertheless, the analogy does serve a valuable purpose. The thrust of this analogy, if it is properly understood, is to demonstrate that Halakhah may recognize two maternal relationships with the effect that the possibility of a maternal relationship based upon a genetic relationship cannot be regarded as excluded simply because there is evidence that Halakhah recognizes a different maternal relationship based upon parturition or gestation. The analogy to agricultural laws does not, however, serve to provide affirmative evidence demonstrating that Halakhah recognizes a maternal relationship based upon genetic considerations.
Although some scholars are reported as questioning the aptness of any analogy based upon determination of species or status with regard to agricultural law, Prof. Low concludes that the analogy cannot be dismissed out of hand and that, accordingly, at least for purposes of halakhic stringency, the child must be regarded as having two mothers. This writer would concur in that conclusion even in the absence of any analogy to agricultural law. The halakhic (as distinct from aggadic) evidence supporting parturition as determining motherhood does not serve to preclude the possibility of a dual maternal relationship. Hence the possibility of such a relationship cannot be ignored unless evidence of its non-existence is adduced.

This point notwithstanding, it seems to this writer that the analogy to the provisions of agricultural law fails entirely with regard to in vitro fertilization if the statement of the Gemara, Yevamot 69b, categorizing an embryo within the first forty days of gestation as "mere water" is to be understood literally. If the fetus is entirely lacking in status and identity during this period it would stand to reason that no maternal relationship can be established during that period. It is only logical that an entity that has no identity cannot be the subject of a relationship, or better, it stands to reason that that which is "mere water" knows no mother. On the other hand, if, as many authorities maintain, categorization of an embryo in the early stages of development as "mere water" is limited in application and, for example, does not serve to prohibit destruction during that period, the analogy is quite apt.

Moreover, an entirely different analogy may be offered in demonstrating that, at least for some authorities, the child born of in vitro fertilization should be regarded as having two mothers. The Gemara, Hullin 79a, in discussing the classification of the offspring born as a result of the interbreeding of different species, records one opinion which maintains that the identity of the male partner is to be completely disregarded in determining the species of the offspring. According to this view, since it is the mother who nurtures and sustains the embryo, it is the female parent alone who determines the species of the offspring. It is thus the identity of the mother which is transferred to members of an inter-species.

There is, however, a conflicting opinion which asserts that "the father's seed is to be considered" (hosheshin le-zera he-av). Presumably, according to this view, "the father's seed is to be considered" because the father plays a dynamic role in the birth of the offspring. In an analogous manner, a similar line of reasoning may be applied in determining the maternity of a child born of a fertilized ovum implanted in the womb of a host mother. It is the host mother who nurtures the embryo and sustains gestation. However, the role of the genetic mother in the determination of identity is a dynamic one and analogous to that of "the seed of the father." It may therefore be argued according to those who assert with reference to the classification of hybrids that "the seed of the father is to be considered" that, in the case of a donated ovum, the maternal relationship between the child and the donor mother is to be "considered" no less than "the seed of the father." Of course, the result of consideration of that principle in situations involving implantation of an already fertilized ovum would be to establish, not a paternal relationship, but rather a second maternal relationship between the child and the donor of the ovum.

V. A NON-JEWISH OVUM DONOR

Yet another complication arises in cases of in vitro fertilization in which the donor of the ovum is a gentile. Ova produced by another woman and donated to the childless couple are utilized in situations in which the infertile woman does not ovulate, or does not produce viable ova, but her uterus is capable of receiving a fertilized ovum and carrying it to term. In such situations the couple may seek a gentile donor, fertilize her ovum with the sperm of the infertile woman's husband by means of an in vitro procedure and implant the zygote in the
wife's uterus. If parturition is accepted as the sole criterion to be employed in determining maternal identity it might be assumed that, since the child has a Jewish mother, the child is also Jewish. However, if the donor mother also enjoys a maternal relationship with the child and the child, in effect, has two mothers, the resulting status of the child of two mothers, one a Jewess and the other a non-Jewess, is far from clear. Moreover, there is reason to conclude that some early authorities would maintain that a child whose genetic mother is non-Jewish requires conversion even if the child is regarded by Halakhah as the child of a Jewish mother. There may even be reason to infer that this conclusion is compelled by statements of the Gemara itself.

This rather anomalous conclusion is based upon the position formulated by Ramban in his commentary on Yevamot 47b. Ramban maintains that a male child born to a woman who has converted to Judaism during pregnancy requires circumcision for purposes of conversion. Ramban acknowledges that immersion of the mother in a mikveh for the purpose of conversion constitutes immersion of the fetus as well but that, in the case of a male, circumcision is required in order to complete the conversion process. However, as noted earlier, the Gemara, Yevamot 97b, declares that, should the same woman give birth to twins, a fraternal relationship exists between the children. If so, Ramban’s position is problematic. If, as he maintains, the conversion is as yet incomplete, how can a fraternal relationship arise? Upon completion of the conversion process, each of the children is deemed to be “a newly born child” and, in the eyes of Jewish law, lacks any familial relationship with previously born relatives even if they, too, become converts to Judaism.27

Addressing himself to the problem presented by Ramban’s position, Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch, Be-Shevilei ha-Refu’ah, no. 8 (Kislev 5747), resolves the difficulty by suggesting that the maternal relationship—and consequently any other maternal blood relationship—is indeed established at the time of parturition and therefore the baby is not “a newly born child” bereft of blood relatives. Nevertheless, since the child’s genotype is non-Jewish, the child requires conversion in order to eliminate “impurity” associated with the gentile state. Similarly, a child born of in vitro fertilization would be deemed the child of the Jewish birth mother but would yet require conversion because of its non-Jewish genetic origin.28

Rabbi Sternbuch’s discussion is unclear with regard to one point, i.e., the problem that he addresses exists even if Ramban’s position with regard to circumcision is not accepted.29 The Gemara, Yevamot 78a, clearly states that immersion of the mother for purposes of conversion constitutes immersion of the fetus. Implicit in that statement is the proposition that the fetus requires conversion. Yet, as noted earlier, the Gemara, Yevamot 97b, declares that if the pregnant proselyte gives birth to twins they are regarded as maternal siblings. If the fetus is a proselyte lacking blood relatives, including a mother, how can it later acquire a brother at the time of parturition? To be sure, absent Ramban’s position maintaining that conversion is not complete until circumcision is performed, the problem might be resolved by postulating that, since parturition gives rise to a maternal-filial relationship, parturition subsequent to conversion also serves to generate a maternal relationship even though the fetus is a proselyte. However, that solution gives rise to a further problem: If parturition generates a maternal relationship, why does it not also serve to establish the status of the neonate as a Jew? If so, antecedent conversion of the fetus in utero, as posited by the Gemara, Yevamot 78a, would be superfluous. This problem is resolved if it is understood that conversion is required in all instances in which the maternal genetic origin of the child is non-Jewish in nature. If so, that conclusion follows directly from the discussion of the Gemara itself rather than from Ramban’s analysis thereof.

Rabbi Sternbuch points to an interesting historical parallel in illustrating his thesis. Our ancestors became “converts” to Judaism at the time of revelation on Mount
Sinai and, indeed, many of the principles concerning conversion are derived from biblical passages concerning that event. Nevertheless, asserts Rabbi Sternbuch, prohibitions concerning incest were fully binding upon our ancestors at that time and encompassed blood relatives who themselves became “converts” contemporaneously. In accordance with the talmudic dictum “A proselyte who converts is comparable to a newly born child” (Yevamot 22a and Bekhorot 47a) the recipients of the Torah at Mount Sinai should, ostensibly, have been regarded as “newly born children” lacking blood relatives. Rabbi Sternbuch suggests that the status as Jews enjoyed by our ancestors at Mount Sinai was assured by virtue of the fact that they were the progeny of Abraham the Patriarch and that “conversion” at Sinai was necessary only in order to remove the “impurity” associated with the gentile state and concludes that conversion required solely for the purpose of eliminating such impurity does not give rise to status as “newly born children” that would, in turn, serve to render consanguineous relationships permissible.

In point of fact, Rabbi Sternbuch’s assertion that our ancestors did not have the status of “newly born children” at Mount Sinai is a matter of some dispute. Rabbi Sternbuch’s position echoes that of Maharal of Prague, Gur Aryeh, Parashat Va-Yigash (Genesis 46:8), cited by the author of Shev Shematata in section 9 of his introduction to that work. Maharal of Prague is of the opinion that, unlike subsequent proselytes, the recipients of the Torah at Mount Sinai did not acquire status as “newly born children” and, accordingly, they were forbidden to marry close relatives. However, Maharal offers a rationale entirely different from that advanced by Rabbi Sternbuch in explaining why those who became Jews at Mount Sinai were not deemed to be “newly born children.” Acceptance of the commandments at Sinai is described by the Gemara, Shabbat 88a, as having been coerced. Status as “newly born children,” asserts Maharal, is acquired only when acceptance of commandments is voluntary.

Nevertheless, R. Meir Simchah of Dvinsk, Meshekh Hokhmah, Parashat Va-Ethanan (Deuteronomy 5:27), espouses an opposing view in declaring that previously existing consanguineous relationships were not terminated at Sinai as evidenced by the fact that all participants were directed “Return to your tents” (Deuteronomy 5:27), i.e., they were granted permission to resume conjugal relations prohibited in the preparatory period before receiving the Torah at Mount Sinai. Indeed, Meshekh Hokhmah points to that directive as the biblical source of the talmudic dictum “A proselyte who converts is comparable to a newly born child.”

The thesis advanced by Rabbi Sternbuch in postulating two types of conversion is remarkably similar to that expounded by R. Naphtali Trop in his Shi’urei ha-Granat, Ketubot 11a, save that Reb Naphtali’s comments are expressed in the positive rather than in the negative. Rabbi Sternbuch’s analysis of the principle “A proselyte who converts is comparable to a newly born child” and his conclusion that it is inapplicable to the recipients of the Torah at Mount Sinai are also identical to those of Reb Naphtali. In resolving a number of problems involving the difficulty associated with Ramban’s position, Reb Naphtali explains that there are two forms of conversion: 1) conversion for the purpose of becoming a Jew, i.e., a member of the community of Israel; and 2) conversion for the purpose of acquiring sanctification as an Israelite (kedushat Yisra’el). Reb Naphtali suggests that one who enjoys the status of a member of the Jewish community is under obligation to undergo conversion in order to acquire the “sanctity of an Israelite.” Presumably, the implication of that position is that obligations pertaining to fulfillment of commandments are contingent upon acquiring the “sanctity of an Israelite.” Thus he asserts that even those authorities who maintain that the child of a Jewess whose father is a non-Jew requires conversion agree that conversion of such a child for purposes of membership in the Jewish community is unnecessary since membership in the Jewish community is transmitted
by virtue of matrilineal succession. According to those authorities, Reb Naphtali asserts, conversion is necessary solely for the purpose of acquiring "sanctity of an Israelite" which is acquired automatically upon birth only if both parents are Jews. Similarly, maintains Reb Naphtali, even according to Ramban, a child born to a proselyte who was pregnant at the time of her conversion acquires status as a member of the community of Israel by virtue of having been born to a Jewish mother and, accordingly, a maternal-filial relationship is also established by virtue of parturition for all genealogical purposes. Conversion, according to Ramban, asserts Reb Naphtali, is necessary only for the purpose of acquiring the "sanctity of an Israelite." 33 Reb Naphtali similarly asserts that conversion at the time of revelation at Mount Sinai was solely for the purpose of acquiring the "sanctity of an Israelite" and, accordingly, prohibitions with regard to sexual relations with blood relatives remained in effect.

On the basis of the thesis developed by R. Naphtali Trop it would follow that a fetus transplanted from a gentile woman to a Jewess would require conversion for purposes of kedushat Yisra'el. It would appear to be the case that such conversion might be performed even during pregnancy by means of immersion of the pregnant mother in a mikveh as is the case with regard to the fetus of a pregnant non-Jewess who converts to Judaism. 34 According to this thesis, the same would be true of a fetus conceived from an ovum donated by a gentile donor. 35

In a contribution to Tehumin, vol. V, devoted to a discussion of the status of a child born as the result of in vitro procedures, Rabbi Abraham Kilav accepts the basic principle that a maternal relationship is established by virtue of parturition. Nevertheless, Rabbi Kilav denies that parturition serves to establish such a relationship in situations in which the ovum was donated by a non-Jewish woman. 36 The fact that a fetus carried by a proselyte at the time of her conversion itself requires conversion leads to the conclusion that a fetus born of in vitro fertilization of an ovum donated by a gentile also requires conversion. Yet, maintains Rabbi Kilav, a maternal relationship exists in the case of the pregnant proselyte but not in the case of an implanted ovum of gentile origin. In the former case, conversion takes place during pregnancy and at the time of birth the child is already Jewish. In the case of in vitro fertilization, the gestational mother is Jewish and no conversion of the fetus takes place during pregnancy. Since conversion of the fetus does not occur prior to parturition, argues Rabbi Kilav, no relationship to the mother is established by parturition. Rabbi Goldberg, on the other hand, maintains that, although the child requires conversion, parturition nevertheless serves to establish a maternal relationship even in such circumstances.

The conclusion reached by Rabbi Goldberg seems to be compelled according to the position of Ramban. Ramban maintains that conversion of a male fetus is not complete until circumcision is performed after birth. Nevertheless, as has been noted earlier, the existence of a maternal relationship between a proselyte and the children converted with her as fetuses during pregnancy is clear. According to Ramban, that relationship exists despite the fact that circumcision for the purpose of conversion did not occur. 37 Hence, the same relationship should exist even if the conversion process has not commenced, e.g., a non-Jewish fetus is implanted in the womb of a Jewish mother, or, according to Dagul me-Revavah, Yoreh De'ah 268:6, if the Bet Din was unaware of the pregnancy at the time of the mother's conversion. Similarly, if R. Naphtali Trop's thesis is accepted, the identical conclusion may be reached even without reliance upon Ramban's position. According to that thesis, membership in the community of Israel is established on the basis of parturition while conversion is necessary for purposes of kedushat Yisra'el. Hence, in the case of the implantation of an ovum donated by a non-Jewish woman, parturition would serve to establish membership in the community of Israel and would simultaneously serve to establish a maternal relationship with the birth mother while conversion would be required for purposes of kedushat Yisra'el. 38
Rabbi Goldberg adds one caveat that is apparently not accepted by either Rabbi Sternbuch or Rabbi Kilav. Rabbi Goldberg asserts that according to those who maintain that the fetus is an integral part of the mother’s body (ubar yerekh imo) a fetus implanted in the womb of a Jewess does not require conversion in situations in which the donor of the ovum is a non-Jewess. Rabbi Goldberg argues that, upon implantation, the fetus becomes part of the mother and, hence, part of a Jewish body with the result that conversion of the fetus becomes unnecessary. In making this point without further discussion, Rabbi Goldberg seems to ignore the possibility that, if non-Jewish identity is established prior to implantation in the uterus of a Jewish woman, transformation into a limb of the gestational mother may not ipso facto result in negation of previously acquired identity as a gentile.

Prof. Low reports an intriguing opinion with regard to a hypothetical question involving a Jewish woman who becomes pregnant as the result of in vitro fertilization utilizing an ovum donated by a non-Jewish woman and who wishes to accomplish conversion of the fetus prior to its birth by undergoing immersion in a mikveh during the course of her pregnancy. Prof. Low cites an oral opinion expressed by R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbuch to the effect that “for [the purpose of conversion] the immersion of the host mother is of no effect” insofar as the fetus is concerned but fails to report the grounds supporting that conclusion. A communication from Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzal is also cited by Prof. Low in which Rabbi Nebenzal expresses a similar view even with regard to a situation in which an already fertilized ovum is removed from the non-Jewish natural mother and subsequently reinserted into her own uterus. Rabbi Nebenzal apparently maintains that, in such circumstances, immersion of the mother is not efficacious on behalf of the fetus. The more usual case, of course, is a situation in which the donor of the ovum is a gentile woman and the Jewish gestational mother would prefer to immerse the child in utero rather than delay the immersion of the neonate until medically advisable.

In each of these cases it is difficult to comprehend why the mother’s immersion should not ipso facto be deemed immersion of the fetus. The Gemara, Yevamot 78a, certainly recognized the efficacy of fetal conversion in the case of natural pregnancy. In the course of that discussion the Gemara questions why the mother’s body shall not be deemed a barrier between the fetus and the water of the mikveh since, because of the interposition of the mother, the fetus does not at all come into contact with the water. The response of the Gemara is, “A fetus is different. That is the way it grows (hainu reviteih).” The import of that response is that, whether or not the fetus is regarded as an “organ of its mother,” i.e., as an integral part of her body, the mother’s body is not a foreign entity separating the fetus from the water. Since attachment to the uterine wall is normal, natural and essential to the fetus, the mother’s body does not constitute an interposition (hazizah) for purposes of immersion.

As a ramification of the laws of interposition, the talmudic ruling permitting conversion of the fetus in utero would appear to be entirely unrelated to the principles that serve to determine maternal identity. It is certainly arguable that immersion of the pregnant woman may serve to effect a valid conversion even if she is not the genetic mother and even if the fetus is subsequently transferred to the uterus of another woman prior to term. Although there is no report to that effect, one may speculate that those who are quoted as adopting an opposing view regard the Gemara’s statement regarding interposition as limited to natural pregnancy. That, too, is difficult to comprehend since, assuredly a skin graft, or hypothetically, a graft of an entire limb, that has become a functioning part of the recipient’s body does not constitute an interposition invalidating immersion in a mikveh. This would be true even if the skin graft covered the entire surface area of the body. The fact that the mother’s body will ultimately become separated from the fetus at birth while the graft is destined to remain in place throughout the recipient’s life should not serve to
negate the underlying rationale expressed in the dictum “That is the way it grows,” i.e., since pregnancy by its nature is transitory the ultimate separation of the fetus from its mother should not interfere with the non-interposing status of the mother’s body.

VI. IMPLANTATION WITHIN THE FIRST FORTY DAYS

R. Aaron Soloveichik is quoted by his son, R. Moshe Soloveichik, Or ha-Mizrah, Tishri-Tevet 5741, p. 127, as being of the opinion that, although the status of the fetus of a pregnant woman who converts to Judaism is that of a convert, nevertheless, the status of a fetus of a proselyte who converts within the first forty days of pregnancy is not that of a convert but is that of a child born to a Jewish mother. That position is based upon the statement of the Gemara, Yevamot 69b, categorizing a fetus during the first forty days following conception as “mere water.” Hence, it is argued, at the time that it acquires the status of a fetus, i.e., following the expiration of the first forty days of gestation, it is the fetus of a Jewish mother. If so, it would logically follow that, mutatis mutandis, a host mother in whom the developing zygote has been implanted immediately after fertilization should be regarded as the halakhic mother of the child, not necessarily because the host mother is the birth mother, but because at the stage of development that it can acquire identity it acquires identity in relationship to the gestational mother. Since, at least at present, implantation of the fertilized ovum in the uterus of the gestational mother takes place in the very early stages of cell division, the effect of this position is to eliminate the need for conversion in all cases involving non-Jewish donors.

This line of reasoning is best understood if it is assumed that the prohibition against feticide does not apply during this early period of gestation because the fetus is “mere water.” However, if, as is the opinion of many authorities, the prohibition against feticide applies even during this early stage of pregnancy because, although the fetus may be “mere water” with regard to other matters of Halakhah, it is nevertheless regarded as a nascent life from the moment of conception, that conclusion may serve to establish the principle that the developing fetus is a “person” in its own right and hence may, even at that early stage of development, enjoy a status independent of that of its gestational mother.

Moreover, if, as is the position of many authorities, including Rabad, Hilkhot Avadim 7:5, Rabbenu Nisim, Hullin 8a, R. Akiva Eger, Ketubot 11a, and others, a fetus is not an integral part of the mother’s body (ubar lav yerekh imo) it is not clear that the child becomes a Jew other than through conversion, (i.e., the conversion of the mother which serves concomitantly as conversion of the child as well) even though the mother’s conversion occurs within the first forty days of gestation. To be sure, even according to the authorities who maintain that a fetus is not regarded as an integral part of the mother’s body, a child conceived by a Jewish mother is Jewish by virtue of the fact that it springs from the ovum of a Jewess. Even though the ovum itself is “mere water,” the developed fetus is nevertheless the product of a Jewish maternal forebear. However, halakhically speaking, the embryo within the uterus of a woman who converts to Judaism is regarded as sui generis. Accordingly, if the fetus is not regarded as an integral part of the mother there is no apparent reason why the embryo should automatically acquire her status.

In his article published in Tehumin, Rabbi Kilav explicitly rejects any distinction between situations involving implantation of a developing embryo during the first forty days following conception and implantation during later periods of gestation. The Gemara, Kiddushin 69a, posits a situation in which a Jewess may give birth to a child whose status is that of a slave. The Sages, whose opinion in this regard is accepted as normative, declare that a master may emancipate a female slave who is
pregnant without simultaneously emancipating the fetus. The master thereby reserves the fetus to himself as a slave subsequent to birth. There is no hint in the Gemara or in the subsequent codifications of this halakhic provision that such a reservation is ineffective if the female slave is less than forty days pregnant. Hence it cannot be assumed that because the nascent embryo is described as "mere water" it lacks independent status and identity. Similarly, R. Ezekiel Landau, Dagul me-Revavah, Yoreh De'ah 268:6, in discussing a related situation, fails to distinguish between the various states of pregnancy. Dagul me-Revavah expresses doubt with regard to the efficacy of the mother's conversion vis-à-vis her child in situations in which the pregnancy was not made known to the members of the Bet Din at the time of her immersion in a mikveh, but does not indicate that failure to disclose this information is immaterial if conversion takes place within the first forty days of pregnancy. In his contribution to Be-Shevilei ha-Refu'ah, no. 8, Rabbi Sternbuch similarly maintains that conversion of the fetus is required even if the mother becomes a convert within the first forty days of gestation.

VII. A JEWISH DONOR AND A NON-JEWISH GESTATIONAL MOTHER

As yet, there has not appeared a detailed discussion of the status of a child born to a non-Jewish gestational mother by means of in vitro fertilization of an ovum donated by a Jewish woman. On the basis of the foregoing discussion it may be assumed that the child would require conversion in order to be recognized as a Jew. That conclusion would be the necessary result of acceptance of parturition as the determining factor with regard to a maternal-child relationship. Even if the possibility of a dual maternal relationship is recognized, conversion would appear to be required at the very minimum for the purpose of acquiring kedushat Yisra'el because of the existence of a non-Jewish genealogical relationship. That conclusion would follow a fortiori from the requirement for conversion of the fetus of a proselyte who converts while pregnant and for the conversion of a non-Jewish fetus implanted in a Jewish gestational mother. It is also entirely conceivable that a dual maternal relationship would result in a status of "half-Jew, half-gentile" analogous to the status of "half-slave, half-freeman," posited by the Gemara in other contexts. If so, the "half-gentile" would require the usual form of conversion. However, Rabbi Kilav, in a cryptic statement, expresses the opinion that in such circumstances the child is a Jew. That view is consistent with his position that in the converse situation of a non-Jewish ovum donor the child is a gentile and that parturition determines only maternal identity but not religious status.

At issue is not simply the status of such a child. Determination of that question has obvious and serious implications with regard to the issue of ovum donations by Jewish women on behalf of non-Jewish infertile couples. Obviously, such donations cannot be sanctioned if they result in situations in which a Jewish child, or a child who is "half-Jew, half-gentile," is reared as a gentile and allowed to become "assimilated among the nations." On the other hand, if the child's status is that of a non-Jew, the permissibility of such a donation is far from clear and, at the very minimum, the procedure is contrary to ideological norms of Judaism. In the case of idol-worshippers, the Gemara, Avodah Zarah 26a, censures various forms of assistance in the propagation of pagan children because the mother "gives birth to a child for idolatry." Permission for such assistance is granted only when withholding of necessary services would result in enmity toward Jews.

Indeed, even donation of an ovum to a Jewish infertile couple in situations in which the child will not be provided with a Jewish education and reared in an observant home is fraught with both halakhic and ideological difficulties that are beyond the scope of this discussion. Moreover, if a maternal-filial relationship between the
donor and the child is recognized by Halakháh, suppression of the identity of the genetic mother would be forbidden because of the potential for an incestuous marriage at some future time,

not to speak of the general odium associated in Jewish teaching with interference with, and distortion of, normal familial relationships.

VIII. ANIMAL GESTATION OF A HUMAN EMBRYO

The possibility of dual maternal relationships may acquire particular significance when, and if, implantation of a human fetus in a member of an animal species becomes an empirical possibility. Gestational development would then occur in the uterus of the animal which would serve as a sort of living incubator. Although, at present, the possibility seems extremely remote, recent developments in science and technology amply demonstrate that the science fiction of today may become the reality of tomorrow. Development of immuno-suppressive drugs has made xenografts a distinct possibility and, although some may find such a procedure repugnant, those developments may conceivably lead to use of animals for gestational purposes. In such an eventuality the crucial question will be whether the product of such gestation is to be accorded status as a human being.

It is evident from the discussion of the Gemara, Niddah 23b, that identity as the member of a particular species is determined, not by distinguishing physical characteristics, but by birth. Thus, an animal-like creature born to a human is regarded as a human being. The Gemara clearly recognized the theoretical possibility of a converse situation, viz., of a human-like creature being born to an animal. If born to a member of a kosher species the Gemara questions whether or not the offspring may be slaughtered for food since, although it possesses a “hoof,” it does not have the characteristic split hoof of a kosher species. From the very formulation of the question it is manifestly evident that the Gemara did not regard a creature of this nature as enjoying the status of a human being.

Thus, if parturition is regarded as the sole determining criterion in all matters of personal status to the exclusion of genetic considerations, the Gemara’s discussion may one day become entirely germane to the determination of the status of a human zygote implanted in an animal uterus. If, on the other hand, the possibility of dual maternal relationships is accepted, such offspring may acquire the identity of the genetic mother as well as that of the gestational mother.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

In the opinion of this writer, the preponderance of evidence adduced from rabbinic sources demonstrates that parturition, in and of itself, serves to establish a maternal relationship. Nevertheless, the possibility that Jewish law may recognize a second maternal relationship based upon donation of an ovum cannot be excluded and indeed there is some evidence indicating that such an additional relationship is recognized. It is also possible that an additional non-genetic and non-parturitional relationship, or even multiple relationships of that nature, may be established on the basis of gestation. Thus, for purposes of Jewish law, the relationship arising from parturition must be regarded as firmly established whereas genetic and gestational relationships must be regarded as doubtful (salek). The primary effect, but by no means the sole implication, of recognition of this “doubtful” relationship is to prohibit marriage between genetic siblings and other genetic relatives.

A child born of an in vitro procedure in which the ovum was donated by a non-Jewish woman requires conversion. Although the grounds are not entirely clear, some authorities maintain that, in such cases, immersion for purposes of conversion must be performed after birth but not by the mother during pregnancy. Whether or not there exists a maternal relationship with the Jewish birth mother in such cases is a matter of dispute.
This endeavor addresses only issues of maternal identity and conversion in situations in which a child has been born as the result of in vitro fertilization. A comprehensive analysis of the various issues that must be addressed in discussing the permissibility of utilization of in vitro procedures or ovum donations in order to overcome problems associated with infertility is beyond the scope of this undertaking. Those issues represent matters of grave halakhic and moral significance requiring informed halakhic guidance.

NOTES


2. See R. Shlomo Goren, Ha-Zofeh, 7 Adar I 5744. See also R. Joshua Feigenbaum, Sha’arei Torah, vol. IV, no. 4; Prof. Ze’ev Low, Emek Halakhah, II (Jerusalem, 5749), 163–172; Dr. Itamar Warhaftig, Tehumin, V (5744), 268–269; and R. Ezra Bick, Tehumin, VII (5746), 266–270.

3. In addition to the sources cited herein, see R. Moshe Hershler, Halakah u-Refu’ah, I, (Jerusalem, 5740), 316–320; R. Menasheh Grossbart, Sha’arei Torah, Sha’ar Menasheh, XV (5684), no. 3; R. Zevi Hirsch Friedling, Ha-Be’er, VI (5691), no. 3; and R. Betzalel Ze’ev Safran, Ha-Be’er, VII (5692), no. 2, reprinted in Teshuvot ha-Rabaz (Jerusalem, 5722), Teshuvot mi-Ben ha-Mehaber, no. 5.

4. See, for example, R. Moshe Sternbuch, Be-Shevilei ha-Refu’ah, no. 8 (Kislev 5747), p. 33 and Tradition, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 128–129, reprinted in Contemporary Halakhic Problems, I, 108. This possibility will be discussed in a later section of this article.

5. This responsa originally appeared in Assia, vol. 9, no. 1 (Tammuz 5742) and is reprinted in Sefer Assia (Jerusalem, 5746) V, 84–93. Cf. the comments of R. Avigdor, Nebenzal, Assia, vol. 9, no. 2 (Tishri 5743), reprinted in Assia, V, 92–93.

6. It is indeed true that culture media are required in order to enable cell division to occur. The specific components of the medium used for this purpose vary widely from one in vitro center to another but usually include human blood serum or, in some places, fetal calf serum to which antibiotics and other chemical products are added. Frequently, but not always, the serum is derived from the patient’s own blood. Nevertheless, there is no reason to assume that nutrients utilized to support metabolism constitute a “third power” effecting parental relationships. It is not inconceivable that medicine may find a way to introduce artificial nutrition intravenously into the fetus in utero in order to compensate for certain natural deficiencies. Indeed, in utero blood transfer is already employed as a means of overcoming certain incompatibilities between fetal and maternal blood. No rabbinic decision has suggested that introduction of blood or nutrients from a source other than the bloodstream of the mother casts doubt upon the maternal-filial relationship.

7. This article is reprinted in Rabbi Gershuni’s Kol Zofayikh (Jerusalem, 5740), pp. 361–367.

8. The primary source affirming a paternal relation is Hagahot Semak, cited by Mishneh le-Melekh, Hilkot Ishit 15:4; Bah, Yoreh De’ah 195, and Bet Shmu’el, Even ha-Ezer 1:10. A similar view is expressed by Helkat Mehokek, Even ha-Ezer 1:8; Teshuvot Tashbaz, III, no. 263; Turei Even, Haggigah 15a; Bnei Ahuvah, Hilkhot Ishit 15; Arukh ha-Ner, Yevamot 10a; Mishneh le-Melekh, Hilkhot Issurei Bi’ah 17:13; She’ilat Ya’avez, II, no. 97; Maharam Shik al Taryag Mizzot, no. 1, Teshuvot Divrei Malki el, II, no. 107; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, No’am, I (5717), 155; R. Israel Zev Mintzberg, No’am, I, 129; R. Joshua Baumol, Teshuvot Emek Halakah, I, no. 68; R. Avigdor Nebenzal, Assia, V (5746), 92–93; and R. Ovadiah Yosef, quoted by Moshe Drori, Tehumin, I (5740), 287, and Abraham S. Abraham, Nishmat Avraham, Even ha-Ezer 1:5, sec. 3. An opposing view is expressed by Yez, Even ha-Ezer 1:8; Birkei Yosef, Even ha-Ezer 1:14; R. Ovadiah Hedaya, No’am, I, 130–137; R. Moshe Aryeh Leib Shapiro, No’am, I, 138–142; and R. Ben Zion Uziel, Mishpetei Uzi’el, Even ha-Ezer, no 19, reprinted in Piskei Uzi’el (Jerusalem, 5737), pp. 282–283. Teshuvot Helkat Ya’akov, I, no. 24, regards the issue as a matter of doubt.

9. In his previously cited article in Be-Shevilei ha-Refu’ah, p. 30, R. Moshe Sternbuch presents an argument quite similar to that advanced by Divrei Malki’el in rejecting a paternal relationship between the donor of the semen and the child born of subsequent in vitro fertilization even when the zygote is implanted in the donor’s wife. Rabbi Sternbuch argues that “the act of conception
takes place in the sterile petri dish itself which acts to commence conception, to unite both of them (i.e., the ovum and the sperm) as in the womb. This is not in the manner of conception since another power is combined therein, that is the petri dish.”

The effect of denying paternal identity, asserts Rabbi Sternbuch, is to prohibit in vitro fertilization entirely. Rabbinic authorities who permit ejaculation of semen by the husband for purposes of artificial insemination sanction that procedure only because it leads to procreation. However, if in vitro fertilization does not result in a father-child relationship it does not serve to fulfill the commandment to “be fruitful and multiply” and hence ejaculation of semen for purposes of in vitro procedures is not permissible. See sources cited above, note 8. With regard to artificial insemination, some authorities, including Arukh la-Ner, Yevamot 10a, and Maharam Shik al Taryag Mizvot, no. 1, maintain that although the child is considered the son of the donor, the donor does not fulfill the precept of procreation because no sexual act is involved. Rabbi Gershuni, although he too denies that artificial insemination results in a paternal-filial relationship, nevertheless regards the procedure as permissible for a married couple. Rabbi Gershuni argues that although artificial insemination does not serve to fulfill the commandment to “be fruitful and multiply,” nevertheless, since the procedure results in procreation of the human species, it serves to fulfill the prophetic mandate “He created [the universe] not to be a waste, He formed it to be populated” (Isaiah 45:18) and hence ejaculation of semen for that purpose is not for naught.

For a vaguely similar reason Rabbi Sternbuch, p. 29, opines that destruction of an embryo fertilized outside of a woman’s body is not prohibited. He states that “... the prohibition against abortion is in the woman's uterus, for the [embryo] has the potential to develop and become complete in her womb and it is destroyed. But here, outside the womb, an additional operation is required to implant [the embryo] in the woman's uterus and without this it will... of its own not reach completion...”. Rabbi Sternbuch cites no sources in support of that distinction. A similar view is advanced, without elaboration or citation of sources, by R. Chaim David Halevy, Assia, vol. 12, no. 3–4. One source that might be cited in support of such a conclusion is Teshuvot Hakham Zevi, no.93. Citing Sanhedrin 57b, Hakham Zevi rules that destruction of a golem does not constitute an act of homicide and is not prohibited because its gestation is not in the form of “a man within a man,” as evidenced by the fact that the Gemara, Sanhedrin 65b, reports that Rabbi Zeira commanded a person created by utilization of Sefer Yezirah to return to dust. That statement, however, cannot be taken as definitive since Hakham Zevi concludes that a golem lacks status as a Jew or as a human being for other purposes as well. See also R. Joseph Rosen, Teshuvot Zofnat Pa’aneah (Jerusalem, 5728), II, no. 7. Genesis 9:6 is cited by the Gemara and rendered “Whosoever sheds the blood of a man within a man his blood shall be shed” in establishing feticide as a capital transgression in the Noahide Code. Accordingly, there would be strong grounds to assume that a Noahide does not incur capital punishment for destruction of an embryo fertilized in vitro, but not for support of the position that a person born of in vitro fertilization may be destroyed with impunity or even for the position that there is no halakhic consideration forbidding a Jew to destroy a developing embryo outside the human body. Moreover, Ramban, cited by Ran, Yoma 82a, and Rosh, Yoma 8:13, maintains that Sabbath restrictions and the like are suspended for the purpose of preserving the life of a fetus. Those comments clearly reflect the view that there is an obligation to preserve fetal life. Thus, there are no obvious grounds for assuming that nascent human life may be destroyed with impunity simply because it is not sheltered in its natural habitat, i.e., its development takes place outside the mother’s womb. R. Samuel ha-Levi Wosner, Teshuvot Shevet ha-Levi, V, no. 47, expresses the opinion that Sabbath restrictions are not suspended for the preservation of a zygote that has as yet not been implanted in the gestational mother on the grounds that the vast majority of such zygotes are not viable but adds the cautionary note that the empirical situation, and hence the halakhic ruling, may change with advances in the development of reproductive knowledge and techniques. The clear implication of his position is that destruction of such nascent life cannot be countenanced. For a further discussion of the propriety of destroying fertilized ova see this writer’s article, “Ethical Concerns in Artificial Procreation: A Jewish Perspective,” Publications de l’Academie du Royaume du Maroc, Vol. X: Problèmes d’Éthiques Engendrés par les Nouvelles Maîtrises de la Procréation Humaine (Agadir, 1986), pp. 143–145.

There are, however, strong reasons to assume that there is no prohibition against the destruction of a nonviable fetus, as is stated by Rabbi Sternbuch, loc. cit. See Abraham S. Abraham, Nishmat Avraham, Hoshen Mishpat 425:1, sec. 19, and R. Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg, Tehumin, V, p. 250. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is contrary to the view expressed by R. Eleazer Fleckles, Teshuvah me-Ahavah, no. 53 with regard to a nonviable neonate. See also Teshuvot Radbaz, II, no. 695.
10. R. Chaim Soloveitchik is reported to have resolved an entirely different issue by declaring that this statement is limited to the case of a woman who converts to Judaism within the first forty days of gestation. See R. Elchanan Wasserman, Kovez He'arot, no. 73, sec. 12, and below, note 27. According to Reb Chaim's interpretation of this source, no further conclusion can be drawn with regard to determination of maternal identity. However, Reb Chaim's understanding of the limited application of the Gemara's statement is not reflected in the compilations of any of the codifiers of Jewish law, in the responsa literature or in the talmudic commentaries.

11. In a note appended to the articles published in Tehumin, the editor, Dr. Itamar Warhaftig, expresses the opinion that, logically, the biological mother, i.e., the donor of the ovum, should be considered to be the mother of a child born of in vitro fertilization. Without offering demonstrative proof, he assumes that any sources indicating that parturition establishes a maternal relationship serve to establish only that parturition gives rise to a maternal relationship vis-à-vis a biological child or vis-à-vis a child with regard to whom Halakhah abrogates the biological relationship, viz., a convert. He entirely fails to consider the possibility of dual maternal relationships. See also R. Ezra Bick, Tehumin, VII, 267–268.

Dr. Warhaftig does however point to what he considers to be a halakhic anomaly. Biblical law provides financial compensation to be paid to the father in cases of fetal death resulting from battery of the mother. Rambam, Hilkhot Hovel u-Mazik 4:2, rules that, in the event that the father has died before the miscarriage occurs, compensation is to be paid to the mother. Although all authorities agree that compensation is to be paid to the mother in the case of the miscarriage of a pregnant convert or in the case of the wife of a convert who is deceased, Rambam's position is novel in a situation in which the Jewish husband has died leaving heirs. Kesef Mishneh, ad locum, explains that in describing this untoward event Scripture employs the phrase "and her children emerge" thereby indicating a possessive relationship vested in the mother. That source, however, does not at all serve to establish a halakhic relationship for other areas of Jewish law. Compensation for loss of fetal life is rooted in a property interest established by Scripture solely for that purpose. Establishment of that property interest is not necessarily predicated upon a familial relationship recognized for other purposes of law. Moreover, as Rabbi Goldberg points out, miscarriage of the fetus is tantamount to parturition and hence miscarriage itself serves to establish a maternal relationship. Cf. also, below, note 12.

12. It would be reasonable to assume that delivery of a viable fetus by means of a cesarean section similarly serves to establish a maternal relationship since such delivery is equated with normal birth for other purposes of Jewish law. See R. Abraham Kilav’s response to Prof. Ze’ev Low, Emek Halakhah, II, 173. Indeed, Tosafot, Niddah 44a, declare that, if a pregnant woman predeceases her fully-developed fetus, the fetus inherits its mother’s estate and causes it to pass to the fetus’ maternal relatives. The fetus inherits, according to Tosafot, because upon the mother’s death its vitality is no longer derived from the mother. Clearly, there could be no inheritance in the absence of a filial relationship. That relationship, then, is established, not by parturition per se, but upon termination of gestation regardless of how that event occurs. Cf., R. Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg, Tehumin, V, 252, note 4. However, contrary to the presumption of R. Ezra Bick, Tehumin VII, 269, there is no basis upon which to assume that termination of gestation at a stage at which the fetus is as yet not viable is tantamount to parturition; assuredly, this could not be the case when the embryo is as yet “mere water.” Accordingly, removal of an as yet non-viable embryo and subsequent artificial gestation in an incubator or the like in a manner similar to that portrayed by Aldous Huxley in his Brave New World might well result in a situation in which the child has no mother for purposes of halakhic provisions predicated upon the existence of a maternal relationship. Cf., however, Prof. Ze’ev Low, Emek Halakhah, II, 164–165 and R. Abraham Kilav, Emek Halakhah, II, 173. Rabbi Kilav asserts that, under such conditions, a halakhically recognized maternal relationship exists between the child and its genetic mother but offers no evidence in support of that view. Rabbi Kilav rejects the existence of a maternal relationship with the donor of the ovum in usual circumstances because the birth mother or the gestational mother is regarded as the mother for halakhic purposes and, he asserts, a child cannot have two mothers. He, however, offers no concrete support for those views. As will be shown in a later section, the possibility that a child may well have two mothers for purposes of Halakhah cannot be summarily dismissed. By the same token, if Halakhah does not recognize a maternal relationship based solely upon contribution of the ovum, a fetus nurtured in an incubator may well have no mother in the eyes of Halakhah. Cf., R. Ezra Bick, Tehumin VII, 270.

13. Cf., however, R. Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg, Tehumin, V, 253–255, who tentatively suggests that the Gemara, in postulating such a fraternal relationship, may be doing so only according to the
view that maintains that the fetus is an integral part of the mother’s body (ubar yerekh imo). See, for example, Avnei Milu’im, Even ha-Ezer 4:3 and 13:4; and Beit Ya’akov, Ketubot 11a, who maintain that although the Gemara Yevamot 78a speaks of the fetus as itself a convert, that description is accurate only according to the talmudic position that maintains that the fetus is not an integral part of the mother’s body. If so, he argues, parturition may establish a maternal relationship only if the fetus is in reality an integral part of her body, i.e., if the fetus is biologically her own, but not in situations in which the fetus is conceived outside of her body and subsequently implanted in her uterus. Nevertheless, there is considerable discussion with regard to whether Rambam maintains ubar yerekh imo or ubar lav yerekh imo (see Lehem Mishneh, Hilkhot Avadim 7:5 and later sources cited below, note 42) despite the fact that in Hilkhot Issurei Bi’ah 14:14 Rambam clearly rules that and a fraternal relationship does indeed exist. Hence it may be assumed that the principle that parturition establishes a maternal relationship is not a product of that dispute. Cf., R. Joshua Ben-Meir, Assia, Nisan 5746, pp. 28–29 and p. 39.

14. R. Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg, Tehumin, V, pp. 255–256, endeavors to show that the statement of the Gemara, Yevamot 97b, regarding the fraternal relationship between fetal converts is not dispositive according to the novel position of one latter-day authority regarding another matter of personal status. R. Jacob of Lissa, in a responsa published in Teshuvot Hemdat Shlomoh, Even ha-Ezer; no. 2, opines that a child born to a Jewish mother but fathered by a gentile requires conversion despite the fact that the Gemara, Bekhorot 47a, declares that if such a child is the first-born child of its Jewish mother it requires redemption of the first-born. Since converts do not require redemption, postulation of a requirement for redemption would seem to contradict the thesis advanced by R. Jacob of Lissa. R. Jacob of Lissa responds by stating that, prior to conversion, the child of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father is a gentile by virtue of his status as the son of a non-Jewish father and, as a gentile, the child does not require redemption. R. Jacob of Lissa further states that, as the non-Jewish issue of a gentile father, the child can have no Jewish relatives. However, asserts R. Jacob of Lissa, conversion has the effect of severing all prior relationships, including the paternal one. At that point, a maternal relationship is automatically and retroactively established. As the firstborn of a Jewish mother the child requires redemption. If so, argues Rabbi Goldberg, it is conceivable that, according to R. Jacob of Lissa, parturition establishes a maternal relationship only in situations in which the fetus undergoes conversion during the course of pregnancy and hence has no already existing filial relationship, but that under different circumstances a preexisting maternal relationship established genetically or on the basis of gestation precludes any other maternal relationship, just as a non-Jewish paternal relationship precludes the genesis of a Jewish maternal relationship. However, Rabbi Goldberg’s argument is not compelling. Even according to R. Jacob of Lissa, it is only the child’s status as a gentile that precludes the genesis of a parental Jewish relationship; there is no evidence whatsoever that an already existing paternal or maternal relationship prevents the existence of a second relationship of a like nature. Cf., R. Ezra Bick, Tehumin, VII, 268.


16. Cf., R. Moshe Soloveichik, Or ha-Mizrah, Tishri-Tevet 5741, p. 125 and R. Abraham Kilav, Tehumin, V, 267. Cf. also the comments of R. Isaac Berger, Seridim, no. 4 (5743), who assumes that either parturition or “pregnancy” may serve to establish a maternal relationship. Accordingly, he concludes that the donor of the ovum has no maternal relationship to the child. However, neither his sources nor his analysis serve to demonstrate that it is “pregnancy,” i.e., gestation, rather than contribution of the ovum that serves to establish this relationship.

17. Tehumin, V, 249.


19. See Maharal of Prague, Or Hadash, s.v. va-yehi omen. Indeed, even if no compelling evidence can be adduced demonstrating recognition of dual maternal relationships, the possibility of dual relationships cannot be excluded unless there is evidence to that effect.

20. Loc. cit.; see also R. Meir Dan Plocki, Klei Hemdah, Parashat Toldot, sec. 1.

21. Even the statement recorded in Megillah 13a serves to establish only that the maternal relationship comes into being at the time of parturition but not that such a relationship is limited to the birth mother. It should be remembered that the paternal relationship arises upon termination of the first trimester of pregnancy. No “paternal” act is performed at that time; it is simply the moment at which the relationship is halakhically recognized. Similarly, parturition may be the moment at which all maternal relationships are recognized, including a maternal-filial relationship based upon contribution of the ovum from which the fetus developed.
22. R. Joshua Ben-Meir, in a critical review of earlier published material concerning this issue that appears in Assia, Nisan 5746, cites a comment of Rashi, Yevamot 98a, in support of the view that maternal identity is determined at conception. Rashi comments simply that recognition of consanguineous maternal relationships in the case of a pregnant proselyte and her fetus is evidence that the fetus does not enjoy the status of a "newly born child" bereft of any halakhically recognized blood relatives, as is the case with other converts. Although Rabbi Ben-Meir expresses astonishment that other discussants have not cited Rashi's comment in their discussion of this issue, this writer finds Rashi's comment to be entirely irrelevant to the matter under discussion. Rashi states only that the fetus of a proselyte is not a "newly born child." He does not declare or imply that the relationship is established at conception—much less so at the time of the sexual act—rather than at parturition. See Assia, pp. 36–37 and p. 40.

23. Cf., R. Abraham Kilav, Emek Halakhah, II, 174, who fails to distinguish these points as separate issues, possibly because he declines to recognize the possibility of dual maternal relationships.

24. In point of fact, there may be evidence pointing to similar principles specifically with regard to determination of identity and status of animal species as well. It is clear that identity in terms of classification as a member of a particular species is determined at the beginning of life. Thus, a mature non-kosher animal is intrinsically non-kosher rather than merely the yozeh, or derivative, of the infant from which it developed. Accordingly, if the animal is eaten as food, the culpability incurred is that associated with partaking of food that is intrinsically non-kosher rather than for violation of the less stringent prohibition associated with derivatives of non-kosher species, e.g., the milk of a non-kosher animal.

Moreover, there is evidence that identification in terms of a particular forbidden status is determined at the earliest stage of existence to the exclusion of other prohibitions that might be generated by other causative factors. It is a general principle that, in ordinary circumstances, a prohibition cannot be superimposed upon an already existing prohibition (ein issur hal al issur) of equal severity. One example discussed by the Gemara, Hullin 90a, is the nature of the prohibition against partaking of the sciatic nerve of the progeny of a sacrificial animal. If not for a specific exception to the general principle, the prohibition regarding eating the sciatic nerve would not apply to the offspring of sacrificial animals. Rashi, ad locum, explains: "For from the moment that it comes into being it is sanctified, but the nerve is, as yet, not generated for one observes that the creation of the embryo precedes the generation of the nerve." The embryo undergoes repeated cell divisions and at some point in the early stages of gestation there is a differentiation with regard to the characteristics of cells destined to become diverse organs and tissues. The nerve cells, and indeed the matter of which they are composed, do not exist at conception or in the earliest stages of gestation. The cells of the nascent sciatic nerve are new, not only to the nerve in the sense that cells possessing such characteristics do not exist at a previous stage, but to the embryo itself in the sense that they are newly generated from nutrients derived from the mother's blood stream. Thus, when those cells come into being, they are generated as being simultaneously both cells of a sanctified animal and cells of a sciatic nerve. Yet, for purposes of Halakhah, their identity as an integral part of a sacrificial animal is regarded as prior to their identity as a sciatic nerve. It follows, then, that the earlier identity and status of the animal determines the identity and status of newly formed cells despite the interposition of a new casual factor that would otherwise govern status and identity, i.e., appearance of the distinctive characteristics of the sciatic nerve.

Here, then, according to Rashi's analysis, is an example of an instance in which the identity of an organism is determined with finality by the earliest causal factor and in which that organism's identity serves to control the organism throughout its life despite the fact that, absent the earlier acquisition of identity and status, the identity of later growths or developing appendages would be determined by other factors. Indeed, while with regard to plant identification and agricultural law the issue is regarded by the Gemara as unresolved and hence, in practice, this principle is applied only as a matter of "doubt" and stringency, with regard to animal species it appears to be the normative rule. This in no way contradicts the earlier conclusion that parturition serves to establish maternal identity. It means only that Halakhah may recognize two mothers, viz., a birth mother and a "generative" mother.

However Tosafot, as well as several other early commentators on that talmudic discussion, speak of the sciatic nerve and other fetal tissues as coming into existence simultaneously and explain the priority of other prohibitions over that pertaining to the sciatic nerve on the basis of the fact that in early stages of development the sciatic nerve lacks the distinctive features associated with that structure. Since none of those authorities offers an explicit reason for diverging from Rashi's analysis, it is not possible to ascertain the precise nature of their disagreement with Rashi.
It is, however, entirely possible that the controversy is precisely with regard this point, i.e., that they reject the notion that identity and status of animal structures are determined from the earliest moment of existence in a manner that unalterably determines the identity of later accretions as well.

25. See above, note 15.

26. For a discussion of the status of the fetus during this period see Contemporary Halakhic Problems, I, 339-347.

27. R. Chaim's thesis that a fraternal relationship exists only if the mother converted during the first forty days of pregnancy was advanced as a resolution of this difficulty inherent in Ramban's position; see above, note 10.


29. The same point may be made with regard to Reb Chaim's assertion cited above, note 10. Reb Chaim is quoted as having raised the problem only in conjunction with Ramban's position.


31. Three versions of Reb Naphtali's shi'urim as recorded and transcribed by his students have been published: 1) Shi'urei ha-Granat (Jerusalem, 5715); 2) Sefer Duda'et Mosheh: Shi'urei ha-Granat he-Hadashim, 2nd edition (Bnei Brak, 5745); 3) Hiddushei ha-Granat ha-Shalem (Jerusalem, 5749), edited by R. Moshe David Dryan.

32. Cf., Zekher Yizhak, I, no. 4, who expresses a similar concept in speaking of conversion, not for purposes of becoming a Jew, but in order to remove "disqualification as a gentile" (psul akum).

33. This material first appeared in Ha-Metivta, Heshvan 5703.

34. The sole question is whether such conversion is biblically valid or whether the status is that of a "rabbinic" conversion. R. Akiva Eger, Ketubot 11a, maintains that biblical conversion of a fetus is possible only when the conversion is simultaneously performed on behalf of the mother. Cf. however, below, note 38.

35. Acceptance of this thesis in explanation of the requirement for conversion of the fetus of a pregnant proselyte may have a significant practical halakhic ramification with regard to in vitro fertilization. The authorities who permit ejaculation of semen by the husband for purposes of artificial insemination do so only because, in their opinion, the procedure serves to fulfill the commandment to be fruitful and multiply." Cf. above, notes 8 and 9. Hence emission of semen for the insemination of a gentile woman could not be sanctioned for the simple reason that, since Jewish law does not recognize a paternal relationship between a Jewish father and his non-Jewish progeny, ejaculation does not lead to fulfillment of the obligation to "be fruitful and multiply." If a fetus that develops from an ovum donated by a non-Jewish woman requires conversion despite the fact that the gestational mother is Jewish, the ostensive halakhic implication is that there is no paternal relationship between the child and its biological father and hence ejaculation of semen by the husband for utilization for the purpose of in vitro fertilization could not be sanctioned in such situations. If, however, identity as a member of the community of Israel as well as a maternal-filial relationship is established on the basis of the gestational mother's identity as a Jewess, the birth of such a child may serve to fulfill the commandment to "be fruitful and multiply" as well. Accordingly, if a paternal relationship is recognized in usual cases of artificial insemination, Jewish law would recognize a paternal-filial relationship between the Jewish donor of the semen and the child of a Jewish gestational mother for all other aspects of Jewish law even though the ovum was donated by a non-Jewess. On the other hand, if there is no maternal relationship between the Jewish gestational and birth mother and the child born of an ovum donated by a non-Jewish woman, ejaculation for purposes of fertilizing such an ovum cannot be sanctioned.


37. Rabbi Kilav apparently maintains that in the case of a pregnant proselyte conversion of the fetus is accomplished, according to Ramban, by immersion of the mother and Ramban intends only to indicate that failure to perform circumcision prior to immersion does not serve as a barrier to conversion. See Tehumin, V, 264.

38. R. Akiva Eger maintains that conversion of the fetus is valid in biblical law only if conversion is simultaneously performed on behalf of the mother and, accordingly, only under such circumstances can there be a maternal-filial relationship. See above, note 34. If R. Akiva Eger does not accept Reb Naphtali's thesis, conversion of the fetus or neonate conceived from a gentile ovum would not result in a maternal-filial relationship with the gestational mother. Insofar as biblical law is concerned, the child remains a non-Jew even if conversion takes place during pregnancy. Were a biblically valid conversion to occur subsequent to parturition it would clearly
result in status as a “newly born child” and serve to sever any possible maternal relationship. Nor is there evidence that rabbinic law established a maternal-filial relationship in cases of in vitro fertilization or embryo transplants. See R. Joshua Ben-Meir, Assia, pp. 30–33 and p. 40.

39. Rabbi Kilav, Enmek Halakhah, II, 174, suggests that, to be valid for the fetus, the immersion must be efficacious for some other purpose, e.g., conversion of the mother. It is however, difficult to comprehend the reason for such a requirement since, if the mother’s body is not an interposition, the fetus should be regarded as if it has come into direct contact with the water of the mikveh.

40. R. Aaron Soloveichik’s view seems to reflect that of his grandfather, R. Chaim Soloveitchik, as reported by R. Elchanan Wasserman, Kovez He’arot, no. 73, sec. 12; see above, note 10.

41. For a discussion of that issue see Contemporary Halakhic Problems, I, 339–347.

42. Cf., however, Tosafot, Baba Kamma 47a, Hullin 58a and Sanhedrin 60b; Taz, Yoreh De’ah 89:5; Shakh, Yoreh De’ah 89:8; and Lehem Mishneh, Hilkhot Avadim 7:5. See also Sedei Hemed, Kuntres ha-Kellalim, ma’arekhet ha-ayin, no. 62; Melo ha-Ro’im, “Ubar Yerekh Imo,” secs. 6–8; and Keseif Nivhar, kellal132, sec. 9.

43. Dr. Abraham S. Abraham, author of Nishmat Avraham, graciously acceded to my request to contact Rabbi Auerbach for clarification of his position. In a communication dated 22 Shevat 5751, Dr. Abraham writes that Rabbi Auerbach expressed doubt with regard to the efficacy of conversion of the fetus during pregnancy “because perhaps she is not its mother and she has no jurisdiction over it” (my translation). Rabbi Auerbach’s hesitation is apparently born of reservations with regard to the conditions necessary for the conversion of gentiles during their minority. It may be inferred from the comments of Rashi, Ketubot llia, that the application of the child’s father or, in his absence, of the mother is necessary in order to effect a valid conversion of a minor. Some authorities maintain that a minor may present himself for conversion while other authorities maintain that the Bet Din may act on its own initiative. See sources cited in Encyclopedia Talmudit, VI, 445. An obvious problem arises in situations in which a child is surrendered for adoption but the natural parents do not know that the child is to be adopted by a Jewish couple and certainly do not formally consent to conversion. A number of contemporary decisors have expressed the view that all authorities agree that when the gentile parents have abandoned their interest in the child, parental application or permission is not required. See, for example, R. Meir ha-Levi Steinberg, Likkutei Me’ir (London, 5730), pp. 68–69. If this concern is the sole impediment to conversion during pregnancy it would appear that it may be obviated by obtaining permission from the donor mother for conversion.

Parenthetically, Rabbi Auerbach seems to have no question with regard to the efficacy of conversion if performed after birth, presumably because parturition establishes a maternal relationship between the child and the birth mother. If, however, the child has two mothers it is not clear that the rights and prerogatives of the donor mother become extinguished (unless, of course, Reb Naphtali’s thesis to the effect that conversion is required only for purposes of kedushat Yisra’el is accepted). If, on the other hand, parturition and only parturition establishes a maternal-filial relationship, the fetus has no mother before parturition and there is scant reason to assume that a minor “orphan” cannot be converted. Moreover, according to R. Akiva Eger, the selfsame problem may remain after birth as well since, according to R. Akiva Eger, parturition may not establish a maternal-filial relationship in such cases; see above, note 38.

44. Tehumin, V, 262.

45. Tehumin, V, 267.

46. The statement of the Gemara, Yevamot 37b, forbidding a man from establishing multiple families whose identities are not known to one another serves as the basis for a ban upon any suppression of information that might prevent an incestuous relationship. See, for example, R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De’ah, I, no. 162, regarding a similar application of that principle in cases of adoption. See also, R. Shlomo Goren, Ha-Zofeh, 7 Adar I (5744).